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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the field to which this dissertation aims to contribute: marketing of 
scientific innovations. I start by clarifying which innovations in science I focus on in the next chapters. 
Next, I explain what marketing entails in the context of this dissertation. I then turn to the main 
research questions formulated along this dissertation and the data and methods I used to answer these 
questions.  
I.1 Science 
Different people have different opinions on what science is. However, in general, two forms of 
science can be perceived. Ziman (2000) distinguishes between science in action and science in 
application. Science in action represents research which entails undertaking a conscious action such 
that a particular kind of knowledge can be acquired for some particular purpose (Ziman 2000). 
Academia carries out this science in action which represents know-why (Kogut and Zander 1992). 
Such know-why is typically subdivided in different domains such as physics, mathematics, economics, 
marketing, sociology, psychology amongst others. Innovations in this context are manuscripts (which 
capture new ideas, theories, …)  or articles written mostly by and for academics, to serve as a building 
block in larger theory or method development. When focusing on the marketing domain, the 
innovations thus are articles published in marketing journals. Such innovations can be discerned from 
technological innovations which focus on development of know-how. While innovations in science in 
action have a high science linkage, technological innovations (science in application) have a low 
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science linkage. Science linkage is the extent to which patent applications for innovations refer to prior 
scientific studies, rather than prior patents (Narin 2001).  
Industries that focus on science in application and where no scientific principles behind a 
phenomenon are being questioned are for example the ICT industry (e.g. software). Different domains 
can be placed on a continuum dependent on their main focus of science in action or science in 
application. For some domains it is difficult to imagine a direct application (such as pure mathematics) 
but for other domains this is much more straightforward such as chemistry or the life sciences (Ziman 
2000). Life sciences contain pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and device-based therapies (Stremersch 
and Van Dyck 2009). This domain easily puts the research into application by developing a new 
medical therapy. Life science in action studies the impact chemical molecules have on the human 
body. Life science in application then represents the newly developed medicine.  
Along this dissertation, I thus focus on innovations within science that focus on action 
(academic innovations) and innovations within science that focus on both action and application (the 
life sciences). Figure 1 represents the innovations we study.  
Figure 1: Action versus Application  
Given the dynamic nature of science, scientific innovations are at the core of progress in 
society. We cannot think of a world without breakthroughs in algebra, which allowed us to develop 
sophisticated encryption algorithms to guard on-line or global financial transactions. The Swine flu 
pandemic that conquers the world would be more deadly than it is currently forecasted to be, without 
major scientific advances in medicine on the influenza virus, vaccines and inhibitors that can constrain 
ACTION APPLICATION
Life Sciences
Academia
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its multiplication. People with high cholesterol levels and consequently a higher risk of heart attack are 
now living longer because of medicines such as Lipitor. These products exist thanks to evolutions in 
chemistry. The global positioning system for navigation (GPS) would not be as accurate as it is today 
without the special and general theories of relativity. Because the GPS uses a network of satellites, the 
constant movement of these satellites relative to observers on the Earth must be taken into account.  
I.2 Marketing of Innovations in Academic and Life Sciences 
At present, it seems that scientific innovations only become useful when they influence our 
lives somehow. Overall, we are mainly influenced by good salesmanship on behalf of the inventors, 
rather than by the intrinsic value of the innovation (Miller, Paul and Paul 1996). Scientific innovations 
are thus worthless when they are not appropriately marketed. Somehow, this idea brings to mind the 
critique that marketing science developed towards the product orientation, best paraphrased by 
Emerson (1803-1882): “Build a better mousetrap and the world will beat a path to your door”. By 
now, we know this to be a falsehood. If nobody knows you exist, nobody will know that there is a path 
worth beating. Marketing is essential to get any scientific innovation ultimately in the hands of people. 
Thus, I embark on a dissertation focused on how scientific innovations are or should be marketed.  
Although this dissertation focuses on different types of innovations (articles on the one hand 
and new medicine on the other hand), both innovations need elements of marketing strategy in order to 
have impact. In Chapter 2, many different aspects of marketing are examined in the context of 
academic articles.  
The academic article has certain product attributes such as a topic and is written by scientists 
who have a status which can vary from well-known and respected to reputationless (Peter and Olson 
1983). Both aspects can influence the degree to which such an article’s idea disseminates. This article 
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needs to target a specific audience (for example managerial versus academic) and subsequently it 
needs to be positioned towards a specific journal (for example Journal of Marketing is well-suited for a 
new conceptual idea). That choice of journal influences the writing style (readability) used by the 
authors and the way of presenting their idea. Academics also use several channels to distribute the idea 
represented in the manuscript such as presenting at conferences, writing a working paper, attending 
seminars, writing books, etc. Promotion in terms of publicity (mailing your paper to colleagues, a blog 
such as the JM blog, winning awards) and personal selling (one on one discussions about the article 
with colleagues in the field) are essential to exchange the knowledge created in the manuscript. 
Chapter 3 and 4 focus on two specific marketing aspects in the context of new medicine: the 
launch timing and price setting behavior.  
I.3 Research Questions 
At the time I started working on Chapter 2, marketing scholars’ interest in scientometrics 
(study of the characteristics and the evolution of a science) was very limited.  Previous studies focus 
on the influence of marketing journals on other disciplines (Cote, Leong, & Cote 1991; Pieters et al. 
1999; Baumgartner and Pieters 2003; Pieters and Baumgartner 2002), the reference diversity in 
marketing journals (Leong 1989; Tellis, Chandy, and Ackerman 1999; Bettencourt and Houston 2001a
and 2001b), globalization of authorship (Stremersch and Verhoef 2005), and the role of readability of 
an article to create impact (Bauerly, Johnson, and Singh 2005). The focal question of Chapter 2 in this 
dissertation is: how do scientometric characteristics of article and author(s) affect the citations an 
academic innovation receives in the marketing discipline? The paper distinguishes between what the 
article says (universalist perspective), who says it (social constructivist perspective), and how it is said 
(the presentation perspective). 
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Chapter 2 has generated a lot of interest since several academics are now exploring the 
scientometrics field in marketing on topics such as networks of authors in marketing (Goldenberg, 
Libai, Muller, and Stremersch 2009), the influence of article order on citation count (Berger 2009), etc. 
The paper, that later appeared in Journal of Marketing, by now has 10 citations. The papers citing our 
paper focus on topics such as name ordering conventions (Maciejovsky, Budesco, and Ariely 2009), 
exceptional publication productivity (Seggie and Griffith 2009), and readability of articles in 
marketing (Sawyer, Laran and Xu 2008). 
  
Research on life sciences in marketing has developed the last couple of years into a new 
research field because of its application area (Stremersch 2008). The core industries of life sciences are 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and therapeutic medical device industries (Stremersch and Van Dyck 
2009). Although some studies in marketing focus on the lead-lag effect (Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 
2000a and 2000b; Eliashberg and Helsen 1996; Ganesh and Kumar 1996) and the choice between a 
waterfall and a sprinkler launch strategy (Kalish, Mahajan, and Muller 1995; Libai, Muller, and Peres 
2005; Stremersch and Tellis 2004) in an international context, no study explicitly interconnects the 
timing of launch worldwide to the price at which a product is launched. The pharmaceutical industry is 
an interesting context to examine this in because both launch timing and launch price influence a 
society’s access to drugs. This is the focal question for Chapter 3 in this dissertation: what is the 
interrelationship between launch timing and launch price of new pharmaceuticals across 50 countries 
worldwide? 
Whereas Chapter 3 focuses on launch price (and its connection to launch timing), Chapter 4 
examines the price patterns across 39 countries worldwide. Pharmaceutical companies have received a 
lot of criticism with regard to new drugs’ prices. Public policy makers often refer to firms’ 
international pricing policies and the inequity of charging different prices to similar patients across 
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different markets for the same drug with the same indication. Beyond the variation in regulation and 
price patterns across international pharmaceutical markets (the focus of prior studies), it is interesting 
to examine how prices in one country affect prices in other countries. Chapter 4’s research question 
therefore is:  are prices interdependent across countries and how does geographic closeness, trade 
relations, or a regulatory tie between countries influence this spill-over in prices? 
I.4 Data and Methods 
This thesis uses a rich diversity of datasets and models, which have in common that they are 
descriptive models on secondary data. For chapter 2, I compose a dataset on 1825 articles published 
between 1990 and 2002 in the five marketing journals Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing 
Research, Marketing Science, Journal of Consumer Research, and the International Journal of 
Research in Marketing. The paper contains data on the number of citations each of these articles 
received by December 2004 and connects these citations to journal, article, and author characteristics. 
A negative binomial count model explains the number of citations an article receives. 
Whereas Chapter 2 studies academic innovations (articles), in Chapter 3 and 4, I focus on 
pharmaceutical innovations (new molecules).  For chapter 3, I source a dataset from IMS Health on 
launch timing and launch price for 54 molecules from different therapeutic classes across both 
developed and less-developed countries worldwide. To analyze the relationship between launch timing 
and launch price, I need to control for other therapeutic category specific or country level 
characteristics. I gather data on the economic and regulatory environment in these countries and 
connect these variables to both launch lag and launch price. I then simultaneously estimate a launch 
lag equation (Tobit model) and a launch price equation. The model takes into account selectivity in the 
sample and possible endogeneity between both decisions.  
Chapter I 7 
Chapter 4 examines the role of cross-national ties on prices of new branded pharmaceuticals, 
across both developed and less-developed countries worldwide. I therefore gather data on the price 
evolution of 16 new molecules and connect this price data to information about the geographic, trade, 
and regulatory connection between previously launched countries and a focal country. A regression 
model captures how the price in a focal country is not only influenced by characteristics of the focal 
country but the price is also dependent on prices in other countries. Moreover, the type of connection 
between countries (geography, trade, and regulation) is tested for in our model. 
I.5 Outline 
Figure 2 shows the focus of each chapter in this dissertation. Chapter 5 contains a summary of these 
papers and future research avenues. 
Figure 2: Research on Marketing of Scientific Innovations
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Marketing  
of  
Scientific Innovations  
Academic  Life Sciences  
 
Universalist 
Social Constructivist 
Presentation 
Citations 
  
Launch 
Window 
Launch 
Price 
Price in 
Previously 
Launched 
Countries 
Price in a 
Focal 
Country i 
    Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
8 Introduction
I.6 References 
Bauerly, R, J., Johnson, D.T., and Singh, M. (2005). Readability and the impact of marketing. in: 
Marketing Renaissance: Opportunities and Imperatives for Improving Marketing Thought, 
Practice, and Infrastructure. Journal of Marketing, 69 (October), 19-20. 
Baumgartner, H., and Pieters, R. (2003). The structural influence of marketing journals: A citation 
analysis of the discipline and its subareas over time. Journal of Marketing, 67 (2), 123-139. 
Berger, J. (2009). Does article order influence impact? Working Paper. University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, PA. 
Bettencourt, L.A., and Houston, M.B. (2001a). The impact of article method type and subject area on 
article citations and reference diversity in JM, JMR, and JCR. Marketing Letters, 12 (4), 327-
340.
Bettencourt, L.A., and Houston, M.B. (2001b). Reference diversity in JCR, JM and JMR: A 
reexamination and extension of Tellis, Chandy and Ackerman. Journal of Consumer Research, 
28 (September), 313-323. 
Cote, J. A., Leong, S.M., and Cote, J. (1991). Assessing the influence of Journal of Consumer 
Research: A citation analysis. Journal of Consumer Research, 18 (3), 402-410. 
Dekimpe, M.G., Parker, P.M., and Sarvary, M. (2000a). Global diffusion of technological innovations: 
A coupled-hazard approach. Journal of Marketing Research, 37 (1), 47-59.  
 Dekimpe, M.G., Parker, P.M., and Sarvary, M. (2000b). Globalization: Modeling technology adoption 
timing across countries. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 63 (1), 25-42.  
Eliashberg, J., and Helsen, K. (1996). Modeling lead/lag phenomena in global marketing: The case of 
VCRs. Working paper. The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA. 
Ganesh, J., and Kumar, V. (1996). Capturing the cross-national learning effect: An analysis of an 
industrial technology diffusion.  Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 24 (4), 328-
337.
Goldenberg, J., Libai, B., Muller, E., and Stremersch, S. (2009). The evolving social network of 
marketing scholars. Marketing Science Forthcoming. 
Kalish, S., Mahajan, V. and Muller, E. (1995). Waterfall and sprinkler new-product strategies in 
competitive global markets. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 12 (2), 105-119. 
Kogut, B., and Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the 
Replication of Technology. Organization Science, 3 (3), 383-397. 
Leong, S.M. (1989). A citation analysis of the Journal of Consumer Research. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 15 (4), 492-497. 
Libai, B., Muller, E., and Peres, R. (2005). The role of seeding in multi-market entry. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 22 (4), 375-393. 
Maciejovsky, B., Budescu, D.V., and Ariely, D. (2009). The researcher as a consumer of scientific 
publications: How do name-ordering conventions affect inferences about contribution credits. 
Marketing Science, 28 (3), 589-598.  
Miller, F.D. Jr., Paul, J., and Paul, E.F. (1996). Scientific innovation, philosophy, and public policy.
Press Syndicate of University of Cambridge.  
Narin, F. (2001). Assessing Technological Competencies in From Knowledge Management to 
Strategic Competence: Measuring Technological, Market and Organisational Innovation, 
Tidd, Joe, ed. London:  Imperial College Press, 155-195. 
Peter, P.J., and Olson, J.C. (1983). Is science marketing? Journal of Marketing, 47, 111-125.  
Chapter I 9 
Pieters, R., and Baumgartner, H. (2002). Who talks to whom? Intra- and interdisciplinary 
communication of economics journals. Journal of Economic Literature, 40 (2), 483-509. 
Pieters, R., Baumgartner, H., Vermunt J., and Bijmolt, T. (1999). Importance and similarity in the 
evolving citation network of the International Journal of Research in Marketing. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 16 (2), 113-127. 
Sawyer, A.G., Laran, J., and Xu, J. (2008). The readability of marketing journals: Are award-winning 
articles better written? Journal of Marketing, 72 (1), 108-117.  
Seggie, S.H., and Griffith, D.A. (2009). What does it take to get promoted in marketing academia? 
Understanding exceptional publication productivity in the leading marketing journals. Journal 
of Marketing, 73 (1), 122-132.  
Stremersch, S. (2008). Health and marketing: The emergence of a new field of research. International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 25 (4), 229-233. 
Stremersch, S., and Tellis, G.J. (2004). Understanding and managing growth of new products. 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 21 (4), 421-438. 
Stremersch, S., and Van Dyck, W. (2009). Marketing of the life sciences: A new framework and 
research agenda for a nascent field. Journal of Marketing, 73 (4), 4-30.  
Stremersch, S., and Verhoef, P.C. (2005). Globalization of authorship in the marketing discipline: 
Does it help or hinder the field? Marketing Science, 24 (4), 585-594. 
Tellis, G. J., Chandy, R.K., and Ackerman, D.S. (1999). In search of diversity: The record of major 
marketing journals. Journal of Marketing Research, 36 (1), 120-131. 
Ziman, J. (2000). Real science: What it is, and what it means? Cambridge University Press. 

Chapter II 11
Chapter 2 
The Quest for Citations: Drivers of Article Impact
1
II.1 Abstract 
Why do some articles become building blocks for future scholars, while many others remain 
unnoticed? We aim to answer this question by contrasting, synthesizing and simultaneously testing 
three scientometric perspectives – universalism, social constructivism and presentation – on the 
influence of article and author characteristics on article citations. To do so, we study all articles 
published in a sample of five major journals in marketing from 1990 to 2002 that are central to the 
discipline. We count the number of citations each of these articles has received and regress this count 
on an extensive set of characteristics of the article (i.e. article quality, article domain, title length, the 
use of attention grabbers and expositional clarity), and the author (i.e. author visibility and author 
personal promotion). We find that the number of citations an article in the marketing discipline 
receives, depends upon “what one says” (quality and domain), on “who says it” (author visibility and 
personal promotion) and not so much on “how one says it” (title length, the use of attention grabbers, 
and expositional clarity). Our insights contribute to the marketing literature and are relevant to
scientific stakeholders, such as the management of scientific journals and individual academic 
scholars, as they strive to maximize citations. They are also relevant to marketing practitioners. They 
inform practitioners on characteristics of the academic journals in marketing and their relevance to 
decisions they face. On the other hand, they also raise challenges towards making our journals 
accessible and relevant to marketing practitioners: (1) authors visible to academics are not necessarily 
visible to practitioners; (2) the readability of an article may hurt academic credibility and impact, while 
                                                
1
 This chapter is based upon the paper that appeared in  Journal of Marketing (2007, 71 (July), 171-193) under the same 
title, co-authored by Stremersch, Stefan and Verhoef, Peter. 
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it may be instrumental in influencing practitioners; (3) it remains questionable whether articles that 
academics assess to be of high quality are also managerially relevant. 
II.2 Introduction 
“What makes an article influential? Why do some articles have enormous impact on the field, and others practically none? 
As both students and professionals, all of us read articles that stay with us for the rest of our lives, other articles are 
forgotten...” (Sternberg and Gordeeva 1996, p. 69)
The saying “publish or perish” rules a great part of assistant professors’ professional lives in 
the race for tenure. However, to what extent the field pays attention to what an academic publishes, 
determines the rest of his/her academic career. It is common to look at the citations published work has 
received for evaluating promotions to full and chaired professor, to evaluate the collective impact of a 
department or school and to evaluate the standing of our journals. “Yet, despite the widely 
acknowledged importance of citations, many scholars have noted that we know little about the factors 
that influence whether a given paper, and therefore a given scholar, is cited.” (Baldi 1998, p. 829) The 
science of measuring and analyzing science to address such issues is called scientometrics. 
Prior studies in marketing have studied diverse scientometric issues. Bettencourt and Houston 
(2001a) identify which method types and which subject areas receive more attention. Hoffman and 
Holbrook (1993) introduce a two-stage procedure to investigate the underlying structure of author co-
citations. Leong (1989) examines the reference source nature for articles published in Journal of 
Consumer Research. Cote, Leong and Cote (1991) study the influence of Journal of Consumer 
Research on other disciplines, while Baumgartner and Pieters do the same for International Journal of 
Research in Marketing (Pieters et al. 1999), marketing journals in general (Baumgartner and Pieters 
2003) and economic journals in general (Pieters and Baumgartner 2002). Zinkhan, Roth and Saxton 
(1992) document the mutual exchange (both referencing to and from) between Journal of Consumer 
Research and other disciplines. Tellis, Chandy and Ackerman (1999) studied four major journals 
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(Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Marketing 
Science) and examined to what extent they are diverse in their references. This topic was later revisited 
for Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing and Journal of Marketing Research by
Bettencourt and Houston (2001b). Stremersch and Verhoef (2005) studied globalization of authorship 
in the marketing discipline and found it increased diversity in the field, but hurt the impact of several 
major journals. Goldenberg, Libai and Muller (2005) characterized co-author networks in marketing 
along several focal network measures. Recently, Bauerly, Johnson, and Singh (2005) have pointed to 
the importance of readability of a marketing article for creating impact. Also, (prior) editors of major 
marketing journals have stressed the importance of presentation and readability (e.g. Mick 2005; 
Staelin 2002). 
The focal question of the present paper is: How do scientometric characteristics of article and 
author(s) affect the citations an article receives in the marketing discipline? This question – to the best 
of our knowledge – has remained unstudied so far. To answer this question, we will contrast and 
synthesize three theoretical perspectives on the drivers of citations and test them simultaneously on a 
sample of five major marketing journals over a 13 year time span. Doing so allows us to explain why 
some articles in marketing have been heavily cited, while many others remained unnoticed. 
We will embed the theory we develop in prior, though fragmented, scientometric work in other 
disciplines. Bayer (1982) examined drivers of citations in the marriage and family literature and found 
that the literature a paper connects to and the authors’ eminence affect article impact. Van Dalen and 
Henkens (2001) show that characteristics of the authors, visibility, content and journals significantly 
affect the impact of articles in demography. Peters and Van Raan (1994) find in chemical engineering 
that mainly author reputation and number of references affect article impact. Baldi (1998) examines 
which characteristics of two papers in astrophysics influence the probability that a citation exists from 
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the citing to the cited paper. In line with the earlier findings of Stewart (1983), in geology, he found 
that articles mostly have influence for what they say, not for who the authors are. 
Gaining an understanding on the effects of scientometric characteristics of an article and its 
author(s) on the number of times an article is cited is very relevant to the discipline. Individual 
researchers and journals alike try to maximize the number of times they are cited. For individual 
researchers, the number of citations is a dominant criterion for promotion, salary increases and 
funding. It also will determine to what extent the individual researcher is seen as a thought leader in a 
certain field of inquiry. For journals, the number of citations determines to a large extent their prestige. 
Journal prestige, in turn, will translate into subscriptions – the likelihood of libraries and individual 
scholars to subscribe increases with prestige – and an ability to attract high-quality and novel 
manuscripts – researchers’ preference to submit their best work to a journal increases with journal 
prestige. For practitioners, a clear understanding of the different characteristics underlying scholarly 
work in marketing is relevant as it informs them on its relevance to decision areas they face and the 
extent to which academic journals in marketing may provide good sources for new marketing 
knowledge in the future. 
The next section develops the scientometric theory we developed in the present study and 
presents our research hypotheses. We then discuss our data. We subsequently explain our analysis 
methodology and present the results. The last two sections discuss our findings, develop implications 
for different scientific stakeholders, consider the limitations and present avenues for future research. 
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II.3 Theory 
We discern three perspectives on the influence of scientometric characteristics of article and
author(s) on the citations an article receives (for our conceptual framework, see Figure 1). The first is 
the universalist perspective. The universalist view on science states that the reward structure of science 
is openness and based on a cognitive procedure (Baldi 1998). Therefore, article characteristics such as 
its cognitive content determine article citations (Van Dalen and Henkens 2001). The second is the 
social constructivist perspective. Social constructivists claim that extra-scientific and functionally 
irrelevant author characteristics, such as author eminence (Baldi 1998), play a significant role in the 
allocation of citations. The third is the presentation perspective. While fragmented, the claim that 
underlies the presentation perspective is that articles have impact for how they present theory, study 
and findings. We develop specific predictions for each perspective. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework
Universalism
Quality (H1a: +)
Domain (H1b: +/-)
Social Constructivism
Visibility (H2a: +)
Personal Promotion (H2b: +)
Presentation
Title Length (H3a: +/-)
Attention Grabbers (H3b: +)
Expositional Clarity (H3c: +)
Number
of
Citations
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II.3.1 The Universalist Perspective 
The universalist perspective is that articles are cited for “what” the authors say. We distinguish 
two different dimensions within this perspective. A first dimension is the quality of the article. A 
second dimension is the domain of the article.
The quality of an article may affect the extent to which it is cited. High quality articles may 
represent bigger breakthroughs and therefore be path-breaking. Therefore, they may provide more 
inspiration to future research. High quality articles may also present findings of higher reliability, as 
compared to low quality articles and therefore be more able to convincingly persuade (Gilbert 1977). 
Thus, high quality articles may be cited more than low quality articles. 
The domain of the article may affect citations as well. Domains may differ in orientation 
(behavioral, quantitative and managerial), method type – the method the article uses (conceptual, 
empirical, methodological and mathematical) – and subject area – the subject on which the article 
focuses (e.g. advertising, new products, relationship marketing) – and thereby may contain articles that 
are more or less cited for several reasons. First, domains may differ in size. Prior research has shown 
that smaller domains attract fewer citations than larger domains (King 1987). Second, domains may 
differ in the extent to which they are relevant to one another. One domain may have relevance to more 
other domains than another domain, by which it may attract more citations (Stewart 1983). Third, 
domains may differ in the extent to which they have reached maturity. Domains that are new may 
represent bigger breakthroughs, as compared to domains that are mature. Therefore the articles in new 
domains may be cited more than articles in mature domains (Sternberg and Gordeeva 1996). Fourth, 
there may be divergence in citation practices across domains, e.g. the citation practice in one domain 
may be to frequently cite other articles in the same domain, while the citation practice in another 
domain may be to cite articles from other disciplines (Van Dalen and Henkens 2004). 
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We may derive the following hypothesis: 
H1: Universal characteristics of an article affect the times the article is cited, in that (a) quality 
positively affects the number of cites; and (b) domain affects the number of cites. 
II.3.2 The Social Constructivist Perspective 
The social constructivist perspective is that articles have impact for “who” the authors of an 
article are. We discern two different dimensions within this perspective. A first dimension is visibility.
A second dimension is personal promotion.
Merton (1968) introduced the Matthew effect in science. It is named after the Gospel 
According to Matthew (ch. 25, vs. 29), “for unto everyone that hath shall be given and he shall have 
abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath” and “consists in 
the accruing of greater increments of recognition for particular scientific contributions to scientists of 
considerable repute and the withholding of such recognition from scientists who have not yet made 
their mark” (Merton 1968, p. 58). His arguments are that “a scientific contribution will have greater 
visibility when it is introduced by a scientist of high rank, rather than when it is introduced by one who 
has not yet made his mark” (Merton 1968, p. 59). As such, we may expect that the work of academics 
with longer publication records, with positions on the editorial boards of prestigious journals, or 
holding an appointment at highly ranked business schools (Bergh, Perry and Hanke 2006) will receive 
more attention, for the same contribution, as compared to academics of lower standing. Visibility of 
authors may also affect article citations in other ways. Stremersch and Verhoef (2005) have shown – in 
the marketing discipline – that articles authored by international scholars are cited less than articles by 
U.S.-based scholars. The theoretical reasoning they develop is that international authors may be 
disadvantaged in visibility when the majority of the domain is U.S.-based. Goldenberg, Libai and 
Muller (2005) have illustrated co-author networks in marketing and argued that more connected 
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scholars are more important in a scientific network. Therefore, work of more connected scholars can 
transfer more easily to the scientific network and receive more citations. Finally, the number of 
authors may also increase visibility. As scholars have different opportunities to present their work, at 
conferences, research camps, doctoral programs, and the like, the number of opportunities at which the 
work can be presented is bound to go up with the number of authors. 
Personal promotion of academic scholars is often a cause for shame rather than pride. While 
personal promotion may be an important driver of impact, some have raised concerns that it is driven 
by vanity (Bayer 1982). Self-referencing is one form of personal promotion (Van Dalen and Klamer 
2005). First, it shows that the authors have confidence in the findings and it may underscore the 
importance of the work. If you do not cite your own work, why should others cite it? Compare this 
with finance, if you are not willing to invest in your own company, why should anyone else? Second, 
while one paper may not have been noticed by peers, a follow-up paper may be and therefore generate 
renewed interest in the original article. In that sense, good personal promotion also relates to the 
programmatic development of one’s research (Bayer 1982). Another characteristic of a good salesman 
is the use of the norm of reciprocity (Cialdini 1988; Jacobs, et al. 2001). Reciprocity is “a social 
interaction where movement of one party evokes a compensating movement in some other party” 
(Houston and Gassenheimer 1987, p. 11).  Scholars may feel indebted to scholars who cite their work 
and therefore may also be more inclined to return the cite, or “you cite me, I’ll cite you” reciprocity. 
Thus, the extent to which scholars cite other people’s work (which we term reference intensity), may 
also make their own work more cited. 
H2: Social constructivist characteristics of an article affect the times the article is cited, in that (a) 
visibility positively affects the number of cites; and (b) personal promotion positively affects the 
number of cites. 
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II.3.3 The Presentation Perspective 
The presentation perspective is that articles are cited for “how” the authors say what they say. 
We discern three different dimensions within this perspective. A first dimension is title length. A 
second dimension is the use of attention grabbers. A third is expositional clarity.
The title of an article is a very important element of any scientific or scholarly article, as it 
draws a reader’s attention and is used in electronic databases to store, search and retrieve articles 
(Yitzhaki 2002). However, we know little about its effect on article citations. Longer article titles are 
more informative and thus may perform their functions more effectively, but they may also hint at 
article complexity (Yitzhaki 2002). Therefore, the direction of the effect of title length on article 
citations is difficult to posit ex ante. 
A second dimension of presentation is the extent to which attention grabbers are included. 
Attention grabbers are words that have a special appeal because they raise attention. For instance, the 
word “new” in the title may hint to novelty of the article and therefore positively influence the number 
of times an article is cited (Van Dalen and Klamer 2005). While unstudied so far, one may also expect 
that the usage of the name of the discipline itself in the title may have special appeal to and thus grab 
attention of a large cross-section of scholars in that discipline. Finally, also keywords may grab 
attention. Keywords are important as it is by keywords that search engines search databases. 
Especially in today’s school environments, electronic searches are becoming more important in the 
search and retrieval of scientific articles. While keywords obviously overlap strongly with method 
types and subject areas, and thus are capturing universalist characteristics, the number of keywords 
may increase the likelihood of citation, as it increases the chance that the article appears in 
bibliographic searches. 
20  The Quest for Citations: Drivers of Article Impact
Expositional clarity is the clarity with which an article explains what it says. This can be done 
by giving a graphic illustration of the conceptual model, adding tables that explain estimation issues or 
robustness checks, and referring complex issues to appendices to improve the flow of a paper. Also the 
use of equations or footnotes can affect clarity, although this effect may be context dependent. For 
instance, while the usage of many equations may be found more clarifying by mathematicians or 
statisticians, it can be obfuscating in other sciences, such as the social sciences. Expositional clarity 
can also be operationalized by formal indices of readability in linguistics (Flesch 1948). One such 
example is the Flesch formula: 206.835 – (.846 * [number of syllables per 100 words]) – (1.015 * 
[average number of words per sentence]). Overall, with increasing clarity an article may be better able 
to promote its content and be more accessible for a wider audience. 
H3: Presentation characteristics of an article affect the times the article is cited, in that (a) title length 
affects the number of cites; (b) the usage of attention grabbers positively affects the number of cites; 
and (c) expositional clarity positively affects the number of cites. 
II.4 Data 
In this section, we detail our data. First, we describe our sample. Second, we detail our 
measures. Third, we describe our sample along the identified measures. 
II.4.1 Sample 
As representative of the marketing discipline, we sampled five major journals, IJRM 
(International Journal of Research in Marketing), JCR (Journal of Consumer Research), JM (Journal 
of Marketing), JMR (Journal of Marketing Research) and MKS (Marketing Science). These journals 
correspond with the journals used by Stremersch and Verhoef (2005). Tellis, Chandy and Ackerman 
(1999) argue that JCR, JM, JMR and MKS may be a good representation of the field. However, all of 
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these journals are U.S.-based journals, for which reason we also include an international journal, of 
which IJRM is probably the best representative. 
We inventoried all articles published in JCR, JM, JMR and MKS (1990-2002), and IJRM 
(1997-2002). IJRM enters the ISI SSCI only in 1997. We excluded any papers with 3 pages or less (as 
these would be editorials, software and book reviews, and the like). Our final sample consisted of 
1,825 articles, 508 that appeared in JCR, 351 that appeared in JM, 504 that appeared in JMR, 328 that 
appeared in MKS and 134 that appeared in IJRM. 
II.4.2 Measures 
We next detail our measures, first the dependent variable and then all independent variables 
(for an overview see Appendix A).
II.4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
An article is “cited”, when it is mentioned in the reference list of another article. We
operationalize the number of citations as the number of citations in academic journals, net of self-
citations, a paper has received until December 31, 2004, from journals in the ISI-SSCI.  Thus, the 
number of citations is the total number of occasions on which an article appeared in the reference list 
of articles in journals, that are included in the ISI-SSCI, which contains a wide set of scientific 
journals. This data set was generated in August 2005 by an automatic algorithm, run by a specialized 
institute in scientometric research (Center for Science and Technology Studies, at Leiden University, 
the Netherlands), with a subscription to ISI’s databases.
The usage of citations, net of self-citations, is fairly common in the – admittedly sparse –
scientometric literature on the drivers of article influence (e.g. articles reviewed in the introduction). 
Citations are an objective measure of influence, impact or attention (Pieters and Baumgartner 2002). 
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II.4.2.2 Independent Variables 
We next detail our independent variables, organized along the lines of the framework from 
which they are derived, be it a universal, social constructivist or presentation framework, providing 
their symbols we will use later on in-between brackets. 
II.4.2.2.1 Universalist Perspective 
We discerned two dimensions within the universalist perspective, article quality and domain of 
the article. Rather than assess article quality ourselves, which would be inherently flawed, we relied 
on the quality assessment of editors and the editorial board. As one may consider article order (u1) as 
the editor’s assessment of the strength of the contribution of a paper, article order may be a first 
indicator of article quality (Smart and Waldfogel 1996; Van Dalen and Henkens 2001). This also 
seems true in marketing (at least we could rule out one alternative ordering – alphabetically on the 
name of the first author – which the marketing journals we study do not consistently use). Article 
order is a reverse-coded measure, going from 1 (lead article) to n (last article in issue).
2
As one may consider journal awards (u2) chosen by the entire editorial board (typically in 
marketing between 50-100 leading scholars) as the choice of the highest quality article by leading 
scholars, awards may be a second indicator. We include a dummy for winning one of the following 
best paper awards, Best Article Award (IJRM), Best Article Award (JCR), Harold D. Maynard Award 
(JM), MSI/H. Paul Root Award (JM), Paul Green Award (JMR), William F. O’Dell Award (JMR), 
and John D.C. Little Award (MKS).
3
                                                
2
 As some editors may only chose the lead article based on quality, rather than the complete order of articles, this may be 
an alternative indicator of quality. We will test it as such in the empirical section. 
3
 Note that selection of articles for awards is not based on number of citations, as they are chosen at the end of the 
publication year and thus citations did not have time to materialize yet. One exception in this respect is the O’Dell Award, 
which is only chosen five years after publication, but our results are robust to the exclusion of the O’Dell award.
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A third indicator of quality may be article length (u3), as editors often provide very specific 
guidance to authors on the length they will allow for the manuscript, in function of its contribution (i.e. 
contribution to length ratio). We operationalize article length as the number of pages of the article. As 
the number of pages may be actively managed by the editor in function of the magnitude of the 
contribution (Peters and Van Raan 1994), it may be highly collinear with article order. However, in 
our sample of marketing journals, this appears not to be the case. The correlation between article 
length and article order is -.40. The reason for this relatively low correlation may be that while article 
order is the editor’s prerogative, article length may also be influenced by the reviewers’ assessment of 
the contribution of the article. 
Prior research has discerned two categories of article domain, namely method type and subject area 
(Tellis, Chandy and Ackerman 1999). We add a third, namely orientation. Orientation refers to 
whether the article has a behavioral (u4), quantitative (u5) or managerial orientation. We dropped the 
managerial orientation variable from our empirical tests, as it showed a very high correlation with 
behavioral orientation (-0.81). We code u4 as 1 when the article has a behavioral orientation (0 
otherwise) and u5 as 1 when the article has a quantitative orientation (0 otherwise). When the article 
covered more than one orientation, all the respective orientations were assigned the value 1. The 
content coding towards these orientations was done by the second author. The coding is based on 
Kerin’s (1996) description of marketing as a behavioral science, quantitative science and managerial 
activity. As this author had doubts about the assessment on 37 articles, the first author independently 
assessed these articles. Then the first and second author compared their assessment on these 37 
articles, and found that only 2 differed, which were then assigned after discussion. Thus, the reliability 
of the procedure is high. 
Method type (u6-u9) is the method the article uses. The second author examined all abstracts of 
the 1,825 articles and classified them based on the presence of keywords for: (1) conceptual 
24  The Quest for Citations: Drivers of Article Impact
(conceptual, theoretical, concept, theory); (2) empirical (empirical or the type of study, such as 
secondary data, interview, field study, etc.); (3) methodological (new methodology, new method, 
methodological); and (4) analytical (mathematical, analytical, mathematical equation). This procedure 
is similar to Tellis, Chandy and Ackerman (1999). If the abstract did not identify any significant 
keyword hinting at the method type, the introduction of the paper was examined (<20%), and in rare 
cases (<1%), the entire article was studied. The first and second author discussed all cases in which 
there could be doubt on the method type, seeking input from experts in the respective fields if 
necessary. Articles can use multiple method types. 
Subject area (u10-u28) is the subject on which the article focuses. We used a similar – to the 
identification of method type – procedure to identify subject area, although rather than directly 
classifying papers into categories, articles were described by a set of keywords that actually appeared 
in the abstract. In total, we used approximately 1,150 keywords. These keywords were then re-grouped 
first in 41 subgroups and then in 19 subject areas that we defined after frequent deliberation among co-
authors.  The reliability of this classification was assessed by the following procedure. JM and JMR 
each periodically publish the classification in subject areas for all articles they publish, using their own 
subject areas. We assessed the overlap in the subject area classification by both journals with our 
classification of all articles in these two journals. In 84.2% of all cases, there was a perfect overlap 
between our classification and the classification by JM and JMR. In 8% of all cases, JM and JMR also 
identified other subject areas in addition to the ones we identified. When this was the case, we re-
examined the article and in 21% of such cases, we also included that additional subject area. In 7.8% 
of all cases, JM and JMR did not identify the subject area we identified. In such cases, we again re-
examined the article, and we reverted to the journal’s assessment in 15% of such cases, but kept our 
own article classification in all other cases. Overall, these results show high reliability of our 
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categorization if one compares them to inter-rater reliabilities that are deemed to be acceptable (85%) 
(Kassarjian 1977; Tellis, Chandy and Ackerman 1999).
4
 Articles can belong to multiple subject areas. 
II.4.2.2.2 Social Constructivist Perspective 
We discern two different dimensions within the social constructivist perspective, visibility and 
personal promotion. We operationalize visibility through the use of multiple measures. To reflect 
Merton’s Matthew effect, we use: (1) publication record (c1) of the authors, by summing all authors’ 
prior publications in IJRM, JCR, JM, JMR, and MKS, since the journals’ inception, (2) editorial board 
membership (c2), by including a dummy variable, indicating whether at least one of the authors has 
been a member of at least one of the editorial boards of the journals we study between the year of 
publication of the article and two years after publication date (1 if this is the case, 0 if this is not the 
case); and (3) the ranking of the business school (c3) at which the authors hold a position, by taking 
the average business school ranking in 2004 (provided by the Financial Times) across all authors. 
Business school ranking is a reverse-scored variable. Articles of which the authors are affiliated to a 
business school with a high ranking, have a low value while articles of which the authors are affiliated 
to a business school with a low ranking, have a high value. 
To reflect the other mechanisms described in the theory section, we also include, centrality
(c4), U.S. affiliation (c5) and number of authors (c6). Centrality is the minimum across the authors on 
the paper of their individual centrality in the discipline. In order to find one researcher’s centrality, one 
has to find the shortest route of this author to all other researchers (based on co-author relationships) 
and then compute the average across all of these paths (for more information, see Goldenberg, Libai 
and Muller 2005). We inventoried this measure for each author in our database from the website 
                                                
4
 We do not have such data on the other journals, IJRM, JCR and MKS, and therefore we cannot conduct a similar analysis. 
While our analysis shows that our classification is reliable for JM and JMR and we see no reason to expect any different 
for the other journals, the reliability for these other journals may be higher or lower.  
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www.mconnectivity.com; out of 1,688 authors, 82 authors yielded missing values and 46 authors did 
not yield a value as they were too separated to calculate centrality.
5
 We used the April 2005 update of 
the website to inventory this measure. Information requested from www.mconnectivity.com, revealed 
that the delay in the update is minimum 2 months and maximum 5 months. Thus, April 2005 is the 
best update to use given that our dependent variable was based on all citations until December 31, 
2004. Note that centrality is a reverse-scored variable. Articles of which at least one of the authors is 
very central to the discipline – i.e. co-authored with many different researchers that in turn co-authored 
with many different researchers – have a low value, while articles of which all the authors are not 
central to the discipline – i.e. have co-authored with relatively few different researchers that in turn co-
authored with few different researchers – have a high value. U.S. affiliation is the share of all authors 
that have a U.S. affiliation, as stated on the paper and inventoried by using procedures similar to 
Stremersch and Verhoef (2005). Number of authors is the number of authors stated on the paper. 
We also operationalize personal promotion through the use of multiple measures to reflect our 
theoretical arguments above. Reference intensity (c7) is the number of references cited by the article. 
Self-citation intensity (c8) is the number of times the authors have self-cited the paper in future work 
until December 31, 2004. 
II.4.2.2.3 Presentation Perspective 
We discerned three dimensions in the presentation perspective, title length, the use of attention 
grabbers, and expositional clarity. Title length (p1) is the number of significant words in the title, 
following procedures used earlier by Yitzhaki (2002). Attention grabbers (p2-p5) are dummy variables 
for words in the title (1 when the word is included in the title, 0 when this is not the case) that have a 
                                                
5
 Also the two other variables of the marketing connectivity project by Goldenberg, Libai and Muller (2005) were 
inventoried and included in the models presented below. However, the Lehmann number showed high collinearity with the 
average centrality, while the number of co-authors showed high collinearity with author publication record. Therefore, both 
were dropped from the analyses and we only include the centrality measure. 
Chapter II 27
special appeal because they raise attention, such as “marketing” (p2), “market” (p3), “new” (p4), and 
the number of keywords that are supplied by ISI (p5). The word “new” may hint at novelty (Van 
Dalen and Klamer 2005). The words “marketing” and “market” may be related to the core of the 
discipline. The number of keywords may affect the likelihood with which the paper is retrieved in 
electronic database searches. 
Expositional clarity is measured by number of equations (p6), number of figures (p7), number 
of tables (p8), number of footnotes (p9) and number of appendices (p10), inspired by Ayres and Vars 
(2000), and reading ease (p11), inspired by the linguistics literature (Flesch 1948). 
II.4.3 Sample Description 
This section describes our sample, first our dependent variable, and then our independent 
variables. 
II.4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
A first way to characterize article citations in our sample is to examine how many cites the 
median article in marketing obtains. Figure 2 displays the number of citations, excluding self-citations, 
the median article in each of the years in our sample has obtained to date. We present these numbers 
for the median article across journals and also per journal (as per December 31, 2004).  
Overall, articles in the Journal of Marketing are cited more often than articles in any other major 
marketing journal. On the other hand, International Journal of Research in Marketing is less cited than 
any other major marketing journal. 
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Figure 2: Median Number of Citations of Articles in Major Marketing Journals 
A second way is to examine, which are the most influential articles in the marketing discipline. 
Evidently, a simple look at the raw number of cites a paper received by December 31, 2004, may 
provide only limited insights. The number of cites an article receives is by definition driven by the age 
of the article, which is commonly modeled using a quadratic time trend (also see, Ayres and Vars 
2000; Landes and Posner 1996).
Therefore we specify the following equation: 
(1)  
2* *k k k kCITE Q Qa g l e= + + +
CITEk is the number of citations that an article k received (excluding self-citations). The 
multiplicative terms capture the time dependence in citations, in which Qk represents the number of 
quarters that the article k has been out. As the procedure developed by Cameron and Trivedi (1990) 
shows that there is substantial overdispersion (p < 0.01), we estimate the model specified in (1) as a 
negative binomial model, and estimate it using quasi maximum likelihood procedures and the 
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quadratic hill climbing optimization algorithm that does not suffer from this problem. We can 
subsequently rank all articles on the residual εk of equation (1). From this ranking, one may distill 
Table 1, which provides an overview of the 20 most cited papers. 
Rank Top 20 Most Cited (corrected for time)
Journal
(Publication Year)
Nr of Citations
(absolute number, Dec 2004)
1 Hoffman and Novak JM (1996) 227
2 Jaworski and Kohli JM (1993) 347
3 Anderson and Narus JM (1990) 384
4 Fournier JCR (1998) 124
5 Kohli and Jaworski JM (1990) 373
6 Narver and Slater JM (1990) 358
7 Doney and Cannon JM (1997) 170
8 Cronin and Taylor JM (1992) 337
9 Day JM (1994) 263
10 Alba, Lynch, Weitz, Janiszewski, Lutz, Sawyer and Wood JM (1997) 153
11 Ganesan JM (1994) 254
12 Zeithaml, Berry and Parasuraman JM (1996) 178
13 Muniz and O’Guinn JCR (2001) 34
14 Novak, Hoffman and Yung MKS (2000) 63
15 Bettman, Luce and Payne JCR (1998) 95
16 Lynch and Ariely MKS (2000) 60
17 Garbarino and Johnson JM (1999) 76
18 Slater and Narver JM (1995) 185
19 Bitner JM (1990) 260
20 Webster JM (1992) 236
Table 1: 20 Most Cited Papers Between 1990-2002 (Controlling for Time) 
II.4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Table 2 describes our sample of articles along the drivers of citations. We offer a historical 
perspective in blocs of 2 years (except for the first year, 1990) in Appendix B, as that may also show 
how the discipline has evolved over time, but do not discuss it at length, for reasons of brevity. The 
first column in Table 2 contains the driver. Column 3 contains a single number (that is a count) when 
it concerns the number of papers in an orientation (u4-u5), method type (u6-u9) and subject area (u10-
u28), and the number of papers with attention grabbing words in the title (p2-p4). Column 3 contains 
the average and the range in square brackets, for all other variables. In Appendix B, columns 3-9 
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contain the average (u1-u3, c1-c8, p1, p5-p11) or the count (u4-u28, p2-p4) of all these variables for 
the sub-periods. 
Value Entire sample
Universalist Perspective
Quality – Article order (R) average [range] 4.5 [1;27]
Quality – Awards average [range] 0.04 [0;1]
Quality – Article length average [range] 14.4 [4;35]
Domain
Orientation – Behavioral count 1190
Orientation – Quantitative count 483
Method Type – Conceptual count 754
Method Type – Empirical count 1412
Method Type – Methodological count 342
Method Type – Analytical count 297
Subject Area – New Products count 132
Subject Area – B2B count 186
Subject Area – Relationship count 91
Subject Area – Brand & Product Management count 303
Subject Area – Advertising count 218
Subject Area – Pricing count 132
Subject Area – Promotions count 75
Subject Area – Retailing count 72
Subject Area – Strategy count 228
Subject Area – Sales count 78
Subject Area – Methodology count 255
Subject Area – Services count 61
Subject Area – Consumer Knowledge count 225
Subject Area – Consumer Emotions count 143
Subject Area – Other Consumer Behavior count 92
Subject Area – Consumption Behavior count 145
Subject Area – International Marketing count 54
Subject Area – Other count 87
Subject Area – E-commerce count 28
Social Constructivist Perspective
Visibility – Publication record average [range] 10.8 [0;83]
Visibility – Editorial board membership average [range] 0.6 [0;1]
Visibility – Business school ranking (R) average [range] 59.1 [1;101]
Visibility – Centrality (R) average [range] 6.0 [4;12,4]
Visibility – U.S. affiliation average [range] 0.8 [0;1]
Visibility – Number of authors average [range] 2.2 [1;7]
Personal Promotion – Reference intensity average [range] 46.2 [0;313]
Personal Promotion  – Self-citation intensity average [range] 2.1 [0;37]
Presentation Perspective
Title length average [range] 7.0 [1;20]
Attention Grabbers – Marketing count 177
Attention Grabbers – Market count 157
Attention Grabbers – New count 99
Attention Grabbers – Number of keywords average [range] 6.1 [1;12]
Expositional Clarity – Number of equations average [range] 4.0 [0;57]
Expositional Clarity – Number of figures average [range] 2.0 [0;18]
Expositional Clarity – Number of tables average [range] 3.3 [0;29]
Expositional Clarity – Number of footnotes average [range] 5.9 [0;38]
Expositional Clarity – Number of appendices average [range] 0.6 [0;41]
Expositional Clarity – Reading ease average [range] 22.9 [0;58]
Number of Observations 1,825
Table 2: Sample Characteristics for Independent Variables 
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At the level of the entire sample, for the variables in the universalist perspective, we conclude 
that 4% of all papers win a best paper award and average article length is 14.4 pages. Most papers 
have a behavioral orientation. Most papers in the marketing discipline also are empirical and develop a 
conceptual theory. As can be seen in Appendix B, this is a constant through the period 1990-2002. 
Brand and product management, methodology, strategy, consumer knowledge and advertising are the 
biggest subject areas. In a historical perspective, the subject areas that have undergone a rise in interest 
are brand and product management (in the last two years), retailing (at the end of the 90s) and E-
commerce (especially at the turn of the century). 
We next discuss the social constructivist variables. The sum of prior articles by authors 
(publication record), being 10.8 over the entire sample, consistently increased, with rising maturity of 
the marketing discipline. While 10.8 may be surprisingly high, note that this is the sum of prior articles 
by all authors on the paper. Given that the average number of authors is 2.2, the average number of 
prior articles per author for the journals in our database is 4.9. On average, 63% of all articles 
published in 1990-2002 in these five journals involve an editorial board member of any of these five 
journals. This has changed little over time. The average business school ranking for the authors of an 
article is 59.1, while the average centrality is 6.0. As the Appendix B shows, the average share of U.S. 
authors declined from 0.9 to 0.7, an evolution also illustrated by Stremersch and Verhoef (2005), while 
its overall sample mean is 0.8. The average number of references increased quite steeply from around 
40 in beginning of the 90s to around 50 in most recent years, while the overall sample mean is 46. The 
average number of self-citations is 2.1. 
The last bloc contains the presentation variables. Articles have titles with an average count of 7 
significant words and include 6 keywords on the average. The average article has 4 equations, 2 
figures, 3 tables, and 6 footnotes. One in every two articles have an appendix and the Flesch reading 
ease is 23 on the average, which is considered very difficult (Bauerly, Johnson and Singh 2005). 
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II.5 Analysis 
This section first discusses the model we estimate to explain citations, after which we turn to fit 
and robustness of the model. Third, we present the estimates and hypothesis tests. 
II.5.1 Model 
To assess the influence of article and author characteristics on citations, we specify the 
following model: 
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with Di = 1, when i=j, 0 otherwise.
CITEkj represents the number of cites an article k in journal j gathers. Di represent the journal 
dummies (with MKS being the base alternative of which the main effect is captured in the intercept). 
The multiplicative terms capture the time dependence in citations, in which Qkj represents the number 
of quarters that the article has been out. Thus, we allow the time dependence to vary across journals.  
The meaning of the other variables is as follows: μr are parameters capturing the effects of universalist 
drivers of citations u1 to uR, (R = 28), δs are parameters capturing social constructivist drivers of 
citations c1 to cS (S = 8), and θt are parameters capturing the effects of presentation drivers of citations 
p1 to pT (T = 11). We again estimate this equation using a negative binomial specification, estimated 
with a quasi maximum likelihood procedure and the quadratic hill climbing optimization algorithm. 
We present our estimates and fit statistics in Table 3. In addition to the model in equation (2) (model 
4), we estimate three models, (1) a universalism model (nested model 1), (2) a social constructivism 
model (nested model 2), and (3) a presentation model (nested model 3). The number of observations is 
1,757, but drops to 1,531 when the number of keywords (p5) is included, as it suffers from missing 
values. 
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Nested Model 1 Nested Model 2 Nested Model 3 Full Model
Variable Coeff Std 
Err
Coeff Std 
Err
Coeff Std 
Err
Coeff Std Err
Universalist Perspective
Quality – Article order (R) -0.02*** 0.01 -0.0156** 0.0072
Quality – Awards 0.53*** 0.08 0.3408*** 0.0792
Quality – Article length 0.05*** 0.00 0.0397*** 0.0070
Domain
Orientation – Behavioral -0.01 0.06 0.0433 0.0531
Orientation – Quantitative -0.02 0.07 0.0309 0.0720
Method Type – Conceptual 0.00 0.05 -0.0219 0.0444
Method Type – Empirical -0.00 0.06 -0.0379 0.0620
Method Type – Methodological -0.24*** 0.08 -0.1102 0.0873
Method Type – Analytical -0.41*** 0.08 -0.1307 0.0889
Subject Area – New Products 0.00 0.08 0.0494 0.0896
Subject Area – B2B 0.09 0.08 0.0891 0.0777
Subject Area – Relationship 0.61*** 0.10 0.5448*** 0.0900
Subject Area – Brand & Product Management -0.06 0.06 0.0673 0.0556
Subject Area – Advertising -0.32*** 0.06 -0.2845*** 0.0597
Subject Area – Pricing -0.04 0.08 0.0162 0.0804
Subject Area – Promotions -0.06 0.10 -0.0261 0.0959
Subject Area – Retailing -0.07 0.09 0.0454 0.0879
Subject Area – Strategy -0.05 0.07 -0.0492 0.0669
Subject Area – Sales -0.37*** 0.10 -0.3242*** 0.0941
Subject Area – Methodology -0.03 0.09 -0.0076 0.0895
Subject Area – Services 0.47*** 0.11 0.5348*** 0.0967
Subject Area – Consumer Knowledge -0.10 0.07 -0.1433** 0.0622
Subject Area – Consumer Emotions -0.02 0.07 -0.0313 0.0677
Subject Area – Other Consumer Behavior 0.01 0.10 0.0328 0.0959
Subject Area – Consumption Behavior -0.03 0.08 0.0545 0.0766
Subject Area – International Marketing 0.27** 0.13 0.0459 0.1087
Subject Area – Other -0.32*** 0.09 -0.2282** 0.0903
Subject Area – E-Commerce 0.74*** 0.17 0.7745*** 0.1690
Social Constructivist Perspective
Visibility – Publication record 0.00 0.00 0.0040* 0.0022
Visibility – Editorial board membership 0.14*** 0.05 0.1386*** 0.0439
Visibility – Business school ranking (R) -0.00*** 0.00 -0.0025*** 0.0006
Visibility – Centrality (R) 0.10** 0.04 0.0994** 0.0405
Visibility – U.S. affiliation 0.16** 0.08 0.0046 0.0731
Visibility – Number of authors -0.01 0.03 -0.0593** 0.0240
Personal Promotion – Reference intensity 0.01*** 0.00 0.0010 0.0010
Personal Promotion – Self-citation intensity 0.10*** 0.01 0.0821*** 0.0092
Presentation Perspective
Title length -0.02* 0.01 -0.0091 0.0081
Attention Grabbers – Marketing -0.04 0.09 -0.1887*** 0.0708
Attention Grabbers – Market 0.15 0.09 0.1386* 0.0755
Attention Grabbers – New 0.05 0.09 0.0996 0.0947
Attention Grabbers – Number of keywords 0.04*** 0.01 0.0063 0.0075
Expositional Clarity – Number of equations -0.01** 0.00 -0.0096** 0.0041
Expositional Clarity – Number of figures 0.03*** 0.01 0.0001 0.0088
Expositional Clarity – Number of tables 0.02 0.01 -0.0048 0.0092
Expositional Clarity – Number of footnotes 0.01** 0.00 0.0009 0.0040
Expositional Clarity – Number of appendices -0.00 0.01 0.0011*** 0.0001
Expositional Clarity – Reading ease -0.01*** 0.00 -0.0201*** 0.0030
Other Variables
Intercept -0.60** 0.27 -0.67* 0.40 0.31 0.35 -0.7371* 0.4363
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JCR 0.80** 0.32 0.09 0.31 0.13 0.38 0.7230** 0.3606
JM -0.13 0.36 -0.30 0.37 -0.83* 0.42 -0.2553 0.3959
JMR 0.46 0.36 -0.06 0.34 -0.18 0.40 0.6375 0.3908
IJRM -3.59*** 1.08 -3.95*** 1.02 -3.68*** 1.21 -3.3400*** 1.0687
QJCR 0.09*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.02 0.0929*** 0.0129
QJM 0.15*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.02 0.19*** 0.02 0.1652*** 0.0164
QJMR 0.12*** 0.01 0.10*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.02 0.1002*** 0.0155
QIJRM 0.40*** 0.10 0.40*** 0.10 0.37*** 0.12 0.3769*** 0.1052
QMKS 0.13*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.02 0.12*** 0.02 0.1358*** 0.0199
Q²JCR -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.0006*** 0.0001
Q²JM -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.0016*** 0.0002
Q²JMR -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.0007*** 0.0002
Q²IJRM -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00 -0.0067*** 0.0024
Q²MKS -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.0015*** 0.0002
Fit Statistics
Akaike Information Criterion 7.51 7.58 7.66 7.48
Schwarz Information Criterion 7.65 7.65 7.75 7.35
Likelihood Ratio Index 0.128 0.096 0.080 0.241
Number of Observations 1,757 1,757 1,531 1,531
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 3: Estimation Results for Equation (2) 
II.5.2 Fit and Robustness 
The Likelihood Ratio Index (LRI; also called McFadden’s R-squared) of our full model (as in 
equation 2) is 0.241. This is satisfactory given the complex phenomenon we aim to explain and the 
property of the LRI to be substantially lower than a regular R-squared measure. We also report the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz criterion (SIC). The fit statistics for nested 
models 1-3 show that model 1 (universalist perspective) has the highest fit (LR-index = 0.128), model 
2 (social constructivist perspective) has the second highest fit (LR-index = 0.096) and model 3, the 
lowest fit (LR-index = 0.080). We found that all models (1-4) provided a better fit to the data than a 
restricted model that only contained the other variables for which we controlled (journal dummies, 
including their interactions with time and time-squared). 
We conducted several robustness checks. First, the models 1-4 in Table 3 show that the 
estimates are relatively similar across model specifications. Except for number of appendices, none of 
the variables changes sign. Significance levels are affected to some extent for several reasons, 
including the increasing number of parameters that are estimated (although there were no signs of 
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harmful collinearity) and the drop in the number of observations when presentation is added (due to 
missing values on the number of keywords). 
Second, as some journals, on the average, have more articles per issue or more pages per 
article, one may also standardize such variables. We ran all our analyses with standardized variables 
and standardization does not affect any of our findings. 
Third, one may argue that IJRM is a journal of a different nature than the other four: (1) it has a 
very different and more diverse geographic background; and (2) we have data on far fewer articles in 
IJRM than any of the other five journals in our sample. Therefore, we ran all our analyses without 
including any IJRM articles. The results we found are very similar. 
Fourth, we also explored non-linear effects of, for instance, article length, productivity, 
centrality, title length and the expositional variables by incorporating quadratic effects of these 
variables. However, the inclusion of none of these quadratic effects improves the model fit. We also 
explored interaction effects. Included interaction effects did not improve model fit and were unstable. 
Fifth, we tested different methods of controlling for the age of an article in several ways. A 
first method was to include q + lnq as a time trend, rather than q + q
2
. The model results were exactly 
the same. A second method was to fix the duration we allow for a paper to obtain citations. We fixed 
this duration to 4 years. Our findings were again the same, except for one estimate (capturing the 
influence of the subject area “other”) that turned less significant and one estimate that turned more 
significant (capturing the influence of the subject area “retailing”). Two more estimates turned more 
significant (for tables and appendices), but their sign was counter to theoretical expectations (= 
negative). 
Sixth, one may wonder whether the effect of article order is continuous as is modeled now or 
whether it is reflective of a “lead article” phenomenon. To test this, we also estimated a model in 
which the variable article order was replaced with a lead article variable, taking the value of 1 when 
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the article was the lead article in an issue, taking the value of 0 when the article was not the lead article 
in an issue. We found similar results. For the awards variable, one may argue that as the O’Dell award 
considers a long time period (5 years), the award committee may include the number of cites of a 
paper as an implicit criterion leading to endogeneity. We therefore, also estimated a model in which 
the O’Dell award is not taken into account. We found very similar results.
Seventh, business school rankings are always debated no matter the source. We also 
operationalized this variable using Business Week’s rankings and have tried different types of 
operationalizations (dummies when the school was included in the ranking or not, average rank across 
authors, minimum rank across authors). The results remain highly similar. The reason for reporting the 
measure based on the Financial Times, rather than the measure based on Business Week, is that 
Business Week is more U.S.-based, while Financial Times is perceived to be more global. We next 
detail our estimates and hypothesis testing. 
II.5.3 Hypothesis Testing 
Table 4 provides an overview of our hypotheses, the underlying theoretical arguments and the 
results of our testing. The latter are based on the findings for the individual effects in Table 3, which 
we next discuss. Confirming H1a, we find that article quality – as reflected by article order (μ1 = -0.02;
p<0.05; reverse-scaled), awards (μ2 = 0.34, p < 0.01) and article length (μ3 = 0.04, p < 0.01) – has a 
significant positive effect on article citations. 
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Effects
Theoretical Perspective Dimension Hypothesis Confirmed? Underlying Theory
Universalism Quality H1a (+) Yes Inspiration
Reliability
Domain H1b (+/-) Partial Domain size
Relevance
Maturation
Divergence in citation 
practices
Social Constructivism Visibility H2a (+) Partial Attention
Personal Promotion H2b (+) Partial Confidence in findings
Attention
Indebtedness
Presentation Title Length H3a (+/-) No Information content
Complexity
Attention Grabbers H3b (+) No Attention
Expositional Clarity H3c (+) Partial, at best Accessibility
Ability to promote 
content
Table 4: Overview of Hypotheses, Underlying Theory and Results 
We also find that domain affects article citations. This mostly seems to apply to the subject 
area and less to the orientation or the method type (papers with methodological (μ8 = -0.24; p < 0.01)
and analytical theory (μ9 = -0.41; p < 0.01) method types are cited less, as compared to conceptual 
theory and empirical papers, in nested model 1, but not in the full model). Articles on relationship 
marketing (μ12 = 0.55; p < 0.01), services marketing (μ21 = 0.53, p < 0.01) and E-commerce (μ28 =
0.77, p < 0.01) tend to be cited more than other articles, while articles on advertising (μ14 = -0.28, p < 
0.01), sales (μ19 = -0.32, p < 0.01), consumer knowledge (μ22 = -0.14; p < 0.05) and other topics (μ27 =
-0.23, p < 0.05) tend to be cited less than other articles. Given full confirmation of H1a and partial 
confirmation of H1b, we find support for the universalist perspective on article citations. 
Providing partial confirmation for the positive effect of visibility on article citations (H2a), we 
find that publication record (δ1 = 0.00, p < 0.10), editorial board membership (δ2 = 0.14, p < 0.01), 
business school ranking (δ3 = -0.00, p < 0.01; reverse-scaled) positively affect the number of cites an 
article receives, but the effects we find for centrality (δ4 = 0.10, p < 0.05; reverse-scaled) and number 
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of authors (δ6 = -0.06, p < 0.05) run counter to our expectations. One reason why the articles of central 
authors may receive fewer citations than the articles written by authors that are less central to the 
discipline may be that – in addition to visibility – they differ in content. The contributions of central 
authors may be more incremental, while impactful breakthroughs may especially develop at the 
boundaries of the discipline. One reason why papers with more authors may be less influential than 
papers with fewer authors is that authors may be less committed to promote the paper when there are 
many authors, because of lack of intellectual ownership. Thus, visibility of an article may actually 
decrease with increasing number of authors. Finally, we find that the effect of U.S. affiliation turns 
insignificant in the full model (as compared to nested model 2). This contrasts with earlier research by 
Stremersch and Verhoef (2005) and may have two predominant reasons. First, U.S. author affiliation 
may co-vary with other author and article characteristics, already covered by the other variables we 
include in the full model. Second, the significant drop in number of observations (in the full model, as 
compared to nested model 2) increases the threshold for significance. 
Providing partial confirmation for H2b, we find that personal promotion – as operationalizated 
by self-citation intensity (δ8 = 0.08, p < 0.01) – positively affects the number of citations an article 
receives, while it does not do so, when operationalized as reference intensity (δ7 = 0.00, p > 0.10). 
Overall, we find support for the social constructivist perspective on the number of citations an 
article receives. 
In contrast, we find very fragile evidence for the presentation perspective, as postulated in 
hypotheses H3a, H3b, and H3c. We find that title length does not affect the number of citations. Thus, 
we do not find any confirmation for H3a.
Attention grabbers in marketing do not seem as effective as we postulated. The effects are 
inconsistent across models, and overall very weak. The only effect that is significant, although it is 
only marginally significant is the use of the word “market” (θ3 = 0.14, p < 0.10). However, closer 
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inspection showed that this is entirely due to the term market orientation, which became a very 
impactful concept in marketing (See Table 1). We conclude that we do not find any confirmation for 
H3b. 
Also the results for expositional clarity are mixed, at best. We find that there is a negative 
effect of the number of equations (θ6 = -0.01, p < 0.05) and a positive effect of the number of 
appendices (θ10 = 0.00, p < 0.01) on citations. Contrary to our expectations, we find that reading ease 
negatively affects citations (θ11 = -0.02, p < 0.01). The reason may be that expositional clarity, in 
general, and readability specifically, may not always be considered positive by peers. Metoyer-Duran 
(1993) finds higher readability scores among rejected than among accepted papers and Armstrong 
(1980) finds that peers rate less readable papers of higher quality, even when the content is exactly the 
same. Overall, we conclude that the evidence for H3c is mixed, at best. 
II.6 Discussion 
II.6.1 Conclusion 
In this paper, we contrasted, synthesized and simultaneously tested three theoretical 
perspectives on the influence of article and author(s) characteristics on the number of citations an 
article receives. We found full or partial confirmation for the universalist and social constructivist 
view on science, while we found virtually no confirmation for the presentation view on science. Our 
findings contribute to the marketing and scientometrics literatures. Towards marketing, this study is, 
as far as we know, the first study to examine drivers of article citations in a comprehensive and 
structured manner. Given the recent surge in attention for scientometric issues in the marketing 
discipline, this paper is likely to stimulate intense debate – both positive and negative. However, this 
debate among marketing scholars is highly needed, not only for the marketing discipline’s sake... If 
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marketing scholars do not debate drivers of citations (which is essentially a “marketing of science” 
problem), who else should, can, or will? 
Towards scientometrics, this study adds to the few scientometric studies that aim to explain 
article citations. It is the first to rigorously develop and simultaneously test the above three 
perspectives and come to a clear synthesis. It also adds new variables to prior operationalizations of 
these three perspectives, such as awards (in the universalistic perspective), editorial board 
membership, business school ranking, centrality, and self-citation intensity (in the social constructivist 
perspective), title length and attention grabbers that refer to the domain (in the presentation 
perspective). 
II.6.2 Implications for Scientific Stakeholders 
Our research has several implications for scientific stakeholders. We discern two main 
scientific stakeholders, namely the management of scientific journals (editor, editorial board, 
sponsoring associations and publisher) and the academic scholar. 
II.6.2.1 The Management of Journals 
Managers of scientific journals strive to maximize the impact of their journal and thus the 
articles it publishes. The present paper shows that not only quality – which in its widest meaning is the 
dominant “acceptance” criterion used by journals – should be a concern of editors. Several other 
considerations should come into play. 
First, editors should be aware of the influence particular domains may have. We identified 
subject areas in which articles typically receive more cites than average. We found that articles in the 
E-commerce domain wielded the greatest influence and have been truly path-breaking as they mark 
the start of an entire new line of research. The relative higher impact for articles on services and 
relationships reflects the increasing importance of these two domains in marketing in recent years 
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(Vargo and Lush 2004). Following this development, editors have called for more research in this area 
(e.g. Bolton 2003). When one does decide for other reasons, to nurture domains of which papers have 
less influence than average, managers of journals may seek alternative means of promoting this work 
(e.g. adding a special conference, commentaries, etc.). 
A second consideration is article length, for which we found it positively affects citations. As 
article length is important, there is a clear argument for journals to “invest” in more journal space, 
even if the number of submissions and acceptances remains constant. This fits the recent conceptual 
argument on journal space by McAlister in the Journal of Marketing (McAlister 2005). 
Third, as highly productive scholars generally have more influence, a fair question is whether 
editors should strive to stimulate submissions from such authors. This could be done by actively 
soliciting or inviting manuscripts from these authors and visiting departments with many productive 
scholars upon appointment as editor in order to have a sufficient number of publications from these 
scholars. While the first has been implemented by Journal of Marketing Research (e.g. under the term 
of the late Dick Wittink), the second advice is followed by almost all editors that took tenure at a 
major marketing journal the last five years. However, one may also criticize such an approach. While 
it may increase the journal’s impact, it may also enhance the Matthew effect in science, which may 
conflict with the “true” (universalist) motivation of scientists.
Fourth, our findings also suggest challenges for editors towards making their journal more 
relevant to practitioners. First, the Matthew effect cited above is contained within marketing academia. 
Practitioners may have their own pecking order. Thus, strengthening the Matthew effect may be 
detrimental to practical relevance. Second, it is conceivable that more readable papers may have a 
bigger impact on practice. At the same time, however, we find it may hurt citations, by negatively 
affecting an article’s credibility. Thus, editors must engage in a balancing act between the academic 
audience and their (potential) practitioner audience. 
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Fifth, our finding that personal promotion – as operationalized by self-citation intensity –
affects article citations also has implications for journals. Reviewers as well as editors should probably 
be lenient on self-citations and not necessarily see them as vanity of the researcher, but rather as a sign 
of programmatic development and good personal promotion. 
II.6.2.2 The Academic Scholar 
As our research shows that high quality research is cited more than low quality research, the 
prime stimulus of academics to produce new knowledge with high rigor remains. However, our study 
does have some clear implications for the individual academic scholar that may not be straightforward 
or at least not always on academics’ minds.
First, career orientation towards specific subject areas is an important consideration. While of 
course, such decisions are driven by interest and expertise, an academic scholar that seeks strong 
influence in the discipline, may also account for other aspects, such as the influence prior work in 
these areas has typically wielded. Obviously, subject areas’ popularity itself evolves over time, and 
thus the results in Table 3 cannot guide towards the future, but are only a reflection of the past. 
Second, as publication record affects citations through visibility, it may be worthwhile to co-
operate with highly experienced co-authors, when one does not have much of a record one self. 
Third, in the review process, some editors may push authors towards reducing paper length. In 
our personal experience, and from talking to colleagues, authors seem to comply quite easily with 
these guidelines. However, our results encourage authors to “fight back” on this and, rather than 
immediately conceding to editors, devote more effort to convincing editors that the paper size is 
appropriate, through emphasizing the contribution they make to the literature. That is, if the 
disagreement on paper size stems from a lack of information on the editor’s part, rather than an overly 
positive assessment of the author towards his/her own work. 
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II.6.3 Implications for Practitioners 
The present paper also has several implications for practitioners. First, Table 2 and Appendix B 
inventory the marketing discipline along many different characteristics and the evolution therein over 
the period 1990-2002. This is informative to practitioners, as it shows, for instance, to what extent the 
discipline or journals can reflect on decision areas they face. 
Second, Table 1 contains the 20 papers that have – corrected for time – made the biggest 
impact on the advancement of scientific knowledge in the marketing discipline. An academically 
interested marketer may consider reading these top 20 articles to develop an understanding of 
important paradigms in marketing. 
Third, our results at least hint that articles that aim to have a high impact in marketing science 
may be quite different from articles that aim to have a high impact on marketing practice. For instance, 
social constructivist characteristics of authors that positively influence academic citations (such as 
editorial board membership and self-citation behavior) may be quite different from social 
constructivist characteristics of authors that positively influence impact in practice. The latter include 
very likely membership of business communities, rather than editorial board membership, and 
referencing in business press and newspapers, rather than self-citations in academic journals. The fact 
that the academic community may have a different pecking order (e.g. the Matthew effect) than 
practitioners, is problematic, given that the elements that determine the academic pecking order may 
be very idiosyncratic to marketing academia and may not be relevant to practitioners. 
Fourth, our results on presentation hint that scientific impact does not have much to gain from 
expositional clarity. If researchers act to maximize citations (which seems to be the current driving 
force at many top-notch business schools), this finding does not hold great promise for the future 
readability of our journals for practitioners. While journals and scholars alike should act to build 
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stronger bridges with practice, the question remains whether our top-notch journals will provide good 
(and readable!) sources to practitioners for new marketing knowledge in the future, a concern also 
expressed by Bauerly, Johnson and Singh (2005). 
Fifth, it is encouraging that we find that article quality is the most important driver of citations. 
However, whether there is a relationship between what academics judge to be a high quality article 
and what practitioners deem relevant, is something that needs further investigation. 
II.7 Research Limitations 
First, while we discern different method types of articles, we did not distinguish different 
empirical methodologies, within the empirical method type. Future research that investigates 
differentiation between methodologies would be most helpful, but it should go a step further than 
merely differentiating between lab experiments and field data, as was done in prior studies (e.g. 
Bettencourt and Houston 2001a; Tellis, Chandy and Ackerman 1999). A related limitation that also 
applies to the subject area variables is the inherent flaws in categorization. While we see no way in 
which categorization could be improved upon and our method seems to compare favorably to other 
categorizations in accuracy, it is a matter of concern and should lead to caution in the interpretation of 
our findings. 
Second, we focused on the number of cites an article generates, net of self-cites. This is 
consistent with prior scientometric studies on influence or attention. However, focusing on citations 
also has shortcomings (Baumgartner and Pieters 2003). For example, article citations may not always 
reflect transfer of knowledge or intellectual indebtedness, but may for instance also be irrelevant or be 
driven by strategic considerations, e.g. citing a possible reviewer (Baumgartner and Pieters 2003). 
Therefore, future research that examines other measures of influence may be very fruitful. We can 
think of: (1) the amount of press attention (e.g. citations in Wall Street Journal, Economist, or 
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Business Week) a scientific article obtains, (2) the amount of educational attention (e.g. inclusion in 
textbooks, marketing classics volumes, or B-school class readings) it gets, and (3) the amount of 
“web” attention (e.g. downloads) it gets.
Third, some of our measures for our independent variables are limited. We measure article 
quality by article order, awards and article length, but these measures may also be related to visibility. 
Visibility is a different causal mechanism than quality and based on our measures we may not be able 
to clearly separate out both mechanisms. While future studies that develop better quality indicators 
may evidently be valuable, it is unclear what indicators those would be. One alternative one may 
consider is a judgment by experts. 
Finally, this paper opens up new issues that are not necessarily shortcomings of the present 
study. First, we still understand little about citation patterns at the individual article level. E.g. why 
does paper A cite paper B? Research that builds upon prior insights and methods by Baldi (1998) 
promises to be quite fruitful. Such research would also have high relevance towards marketing, given 
that it can be tied to prior work on the influence of marketing in other domains (e.g. the work of 
Baumgartner and Pieters) and co-author networks (Goldenberg, Libai and Muller 2005). It can also be 
tied to our finding regarding editorial board membership. We found editorial board members to be 
more cited than scholars that are not a member of an editorial board. Considerable gamesmanship in 
citing editorial board members may underlie this finding. One course one can take to investigate this 
issue is to examine whether joining the board of a journal causes a regime break in the number of 
citations for articles in that same journal that were (co-)authored by that new board member. The 
difficulty of such research endeavor is in determining the appropriate time lag to consider as the effect 
takes place upon submission, not upon publication, of an article. 
Second, how do disciplines compare to each other in the factors that drive article citations? For 
instance, how does the marketing discipline compare to other business disciplines, or some of its 
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source disciplines, such as economics, sociology and psychology? Also how do the social sciences 
compare to the natural sciences? These are all valid questions worthy of empirical investigation. 
Third, we focus almost exclusively on the impact of articles on further scientific development, 
through citations. However, a vast area remains unexplored, namely what is the influence of our 
scientific articles on marketing practice? Empirical investigation of this question is of very high 
importance to our field. 
In sum, this paper contributes to early scientometric insights on the influence of article and 
author characteristics on article citations, but leaves many related issues open for further investigation. 
However, as the quest for citations is one of the prime extrinsic motivations to scientists, it deserves 
more of our attention. 
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Chapter 3 
Launch Lag and Price of New Pharmaceuticals: 
A Global Inquiry
6
III.1 Abstract 
In the pharmaceutical industry, companies and health regulators trade off a new drug’s launch 
lag and a drug’s launch price. An early launch, even if at a lower price, allows companies a longer 
time under patent protection to recoup their R&D investments. A relatively high price may outweigh 
the benefits of early market access for regulators. To examine the influence of launch lag on launch 
price, and vice versa, we study the launch lag and price of 58 molecules and 50 countries worldwide.  
We find that launch price has a U-shaped effect on launch lag, while launch lag has an inverted U-
shaped effect on launch price. The fastest launch occurs when the launch price is moderately high and 
the highest price occurs at a launch lag of 48 months. From our model, we also learn that both parties 
do not strategically use launch price to influence launch lag, while health regulators use launch lag to 
decrease the launch price. Our findings inform highly relevant decisions by firms – on international 
launch lag and price – that impact their bottom line. These findings also allow regulators and firms 
alike to benchmark launch lag and price across countries. 
                                                
6
 This chapter is based upon a paper with the same title co-authored by Stremersch, Stefan and Croux, Christophe which is 
presently under review. We acknowledge data support by IMS Health.  
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III.2 Introduction 
Marketing scholars have always posed a strong interest in the launch of innovations. A good 
example is the literature on order of entry that focuses on firms’ launch timing. As of the 80s, scholars 
have debated whether order of entry effects exist and if yes, what their effects are on long term 
survival and success (Boulding & Christen, 2003; Golder & Tellis, 1993; Kalyanaram, Robinson, & 
Urban, 1995; Min, Kalwani, & Robinson, 2006; Moore, Boulding, & Goodstein, 1991; Robinson & 
Chiang, 2002; Shankar, Carpenter, & Krishnamurthi, 1998 and 1999).  
However, launch timing in the international realm has received much less attention. This lack of 
attention contrasts sharply with the high relevance that decisions such as when and where to launch, 
have for today’s globally operating firms. The rare exception is the diffusion literature where scholars 
have examined the lead-lag or learning effect (Dekimpe, Parker, & Sarvary, 2000a and 2000b;
Eliashberg & Helsen, 1996; Ganesh & Kumar, 1996) and the choice between a waterfall and a 
sprinkler launch strategy (Kalish, Mahajan, & Muller, 1995; Libai, Muller, & Peres, 2005; Stremersch 
& Tellis, 2004).
7
Also in economics, there are few studies that have explored the drivers of launch timing across 
countries (Danzon, Wang, & Wang, 2005; Kyle, 2007; Lanjouw, 2005). These studies all focus on the 
pharmaceutical industry. In this industry, regulatory bodies such as the FDA and EMEA (the European 
counterpart of FDA) review and approve a new drug’s effectiveness and safety. After additional 
negotiations between the health regulator and the pharmaceutical company, a drug can be launched at 
a specific time and at a specific launch price. While some studies have provided a description of cross-
national price disparities, their causes have received limited attention (Berndt, 2000; Danzon & Chao, 
                                                
7
 The lead-lag effect refers to the learning effect which states that inhabitants in lag countries (in which the product was 
subsequently introduced) learn from lead countries (in which the product was introduced first). A waterfall introduction 
strategy refers to the sequential entry across countries, while a sprinkler strategy refers to the simultaneous entry in all 
countries. 
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2000; Danzon & Furukawa, 2003 and 2006; Danzon & Kim, 1998; Huttin, 1999). Chintagunta and 
Desiraju (2005) looked at pricing of drugs across 5 markets for one specific category, but did not focus 
on launch prices, nor on the relation with launch timing. 
In sum, prior literature, both in marketing and economics, both on pharmaceutical and other markets, 
has overlooked the interrelationship between launch lag
8
 and launch price. Examining how launch lag 
and launch price are intertwined can provide exploratory insights on both pharmaceutical companies’ 
and health regulators’ behavior. Pharmaceutical firms aim to recoup R&D investments through early 
access (i.e. a long life cycle under patent protection) and high price, both of which have an important 
impact on companies’ bottom line (Boulding & Christen, 2003; Danzon et al., 2005; Wagner and 
McCarthy, 2004). Given that drug prices show high inertia, the launch price has a high impact on 
future pricing (Berndt, Danzon, & Kruse, 2007), and ultimately on profits (Gregson, Sparrowhawk, 
Mauskoph, & Paul, 2005, p. 127). Health regulators wish to lower health costs, but at the same time 
make new life-enhancing and life-saving drugs available to the population. Launch lag and launch 
price are the result of negotiations between companies and health regulators, which we will discuss 
more fully below.  
We gathered the launch dates and launch prices for 58 molecules, across 29 different therapeutic 
categories and 50 – both developed and developing – countries worldwide, yielding a rich dataset, on 
both a molecule and country level. We simultaneously estimate a launch lag and launch price equation, 
capturing the potential endogeneity of these decisions.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We first discuss the interrelationship between 
launch lag and launch price. We then present our data and descriptives, the modeling framework, and 
our results. Finally, we discuss our findings, limitations and avenues for further research. 
                                                
8
 Launch window is the difference in months between the month in which a drug was launched in the first country 
worldwide, and the month in which a drug was launched in a subsequent country. 
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III.3 The Interrelationship between Launch Lag and Launch Price 
In the pharmaceutical industry, launch lag and launch price are the result of an undisclosed – and 
thus unobserved by the analyst – negotiation process between health regulators (e.g. governments and 
government institutes) on the one hand and pharmaceutical companies on the other hand (Danzon et 
al., 2005, Garattini & Ghislandi, 2007). The role of each of these parties and their influence over the 
final outcome differs across countries. For instance, most European health regulators have more power 
over firms’ launch price than health regulators in the U.S.  However, even in the U.S., health 
regulators can leverage their negotiating power towards drug prices, through their influence on 
formularies (Wall Street Journal, 2006).  
Parties’ influence on the ultimate outcome of negotiations (i.e. bargaining power) may lie in their 
aspiration levels, limits for negotiation and time pressure under which the negotiations take place 
(Balakrishnan & Eliashberg, 1995; Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985;  Carnevale and Lawler, 
1986; McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986; Yukl 1974). 
Pharmaceutical companies aspire to recoup their R&D investments in new drugs through a high price 
and a long patent-protected period of market exclusivity (Calfee, Villarreal, Dupré, 2006;  Giaccotto, 
Santerre, & Vernon, 2005; Gregson et al., 2005). Patent-protection periods are fixed periods of time 
that start whenever the firm submits its initial filing for approval of a molecule (Danzon et al. 2005, 
Dimasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003). Once this period ends, generics enter the market at low prices 
and branded drugs increasingly lose sales to the cheaper generics (Morton, 1999). Health regulators 
aspire to keep pharmaceutical drug expenditures as low as possible (Cohen, Faden, Predaris, & Young, 
2007; Gregson et al., 2005, p. 121).  
A low drug price will lower the aspirations a firm has for a market, consequently delaying its entry 
(Financial Times, 2007). Entry in low-price markets may provide a limited return, because a low price 
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negatively affects a firm’s revenues and margin. At the same time, it may provoke negative cross-
country spill-over effects for the firm (Hunter, 2005). Regulators in other countries may take low-price 
markets as reference markets, thus tempering the prices they will approve of in their own market, 
potentially lowering global revenues for the firm. Also, parallel trade may occur from a low-price to a 
high-price country, threatening the revenues of the firm in a high-price market.  
At the same time, a high price may lower the aspirations of the regulator or insurance companies, as it 
may put pressure on health budgets (Comanor & Schweitzer, 2007). Therefore, regulators may decide 
to slow down the drug’s market access – in many countries, regulatory price approval is needed prior 
to launch – or insurance companies may decide not to reimburse the drug – insurance companies are 
an important gate-keeper in liberal markets. Lower aspirations of regulators and insurance companies 
may negatively affect the prospects the manufacturer has for a certain market, preventing a fast entry. 
We expect that the interests of payer (regulator and insurer) and company co-align at moderately high 
prices for early access. Such effect bears resemblance to the finding in the negotiation literature that 
challenging, yet obtainable goals lead to an integrative solution for both parties involved (McAlister et 
al., 1986). 
We hypothesize:  
H1: Launch price has a U-shaped effect on launch lag.  
As to price negotiations, both firms and health regulators set price limits. The firm sets a 
minimum ask price (also called, the floor price) in a country, beneath which it will not launch the new 
drug. Health regulators set a maximum offer price (also called, the ceiling price), above which it will 
not grant market access to the new drug (Danzon et al., 2005). If the negotiation is successful, the 
negotiated price will be in-between the firm’s floor price and the regulator’s ceiling price.
In countries where drugs can be launched quickly, pharmaceutical firms will show relatively low floor 
prices as they enjoy a long time under patent protection (Gregson et al., 2005). In such markets, 
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negotiated prices will therefore be relatively low. As markets take more time to access, the firm loses a 
part of the patent-protected period and will increase its floor price (Srivastava, Chakravarti, & 
Rapoport, 2000). Also time pressure on the health regulator to make the new drug available to the 
population may increase (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986), consequently leading to a higher ceiling price. 
The outcome of a higher floor price and a higher ceiling price will lead to a higher negotiated price. 
However, regulators vary in the time pressure they experience to grant access. Markets that show very 
long delays in launch are typically markets in which regulators feel little time pressure to make the 
drug available to the population. In such markets, pharmaceutical firms will eventually concede on a 
low price (Pruitt, 1981), to still get some return on investment before the patent expires.  
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2: Launch lag has an inverted U-shaped effect on launch price.  
In the data section, we discuss the variables for which we control in our empirical analysis. 
III.4 Data 
In this section, we give an overview of the research context and define the variables, after which 
we present descriptives of international launch lag and launch price patterns. 
III.4.1 Research Context 
We obtained data on launch lag and launch price for 58 new molecules (active substances of a 
drug) in 5 anatomical therapeutic classes (ATC; WHO Collaboratory Center for Drug Statistics 
Methodology) and 50 countries (both developed and developing countries) worldwide from IMS 
Health (see Table 1).
9
                                                
9
 Given the sample of 58 new molecules across 50 countries, there are 2,900 possible molecule-country combinations. 
However, given right censoring in the data, of these 2,900 possible molecule-country pairs, 2,045 remain. We will use 
these 2,045 observations for our descriptives on launch lag and price, below. As we will regress launch price and launch 
window on other country characteristics, such as regulation, which is unavailable for 8 countries (Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, 
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We selected these molecules for several reasons. First, these molecules’ retail sales represent more 
than 90% of their total sales volume, meaning they are consistently used in the outpatient environment. 
Second, because our analyses required information on launch lag and launch price, we were limited to 
use the molecules launched as of 02/94 due to data handling procedures of our data supplier IMS 
Health.  Column 1 in Table 1 represents the categories ATC1 and ATC3
10
 to which our molecules 
belong. Column 2 gives the more specific fourth level ATC code and the last column gives the number 
of molecules in our dataset that belong to these categories. 
ATC1 and ATC3 Codes ATC4 Code Nr of Molecules
ATC1: A Alimentary tract and metabolism 12
A2B: drugs for peptic ulcer and reflux disease A2BC 1
A3A: drugs for functional bowel disorder A3AE 1
A4A: antiemetics and antinauseants A4AA 2
A7E: intestinal anti-inflammatory agents A7EC 1
A8A: antiobesity preparations excl. diet products A8AB 2
A10B: blood glucose lowering drugs excl. insulins A10BG 3
A10BX 2
ATC1: C Cardiovascular system 11
C2K: other antihypertensives C2KX 1
C3D: potassium sparing agents C3DA 1
C9C: angiotensin II antagonists, plain C9CA 4
C10A: lipid modifying agents, plain C10AA 4
C10AX 1
ATC1: G Genito-urinary system and sex hormones 9
G3X: other sex hormones and modulators of the genital 
system
G3XC 1
G4B: other urologicals, incl. antispasmodics G4BD 2
G4BE 5
G4C: drugs used in benign prostatic hypertrophy G4CB 1
ATC1: J Antiinfectives for systemic use 19
J1D: other beta-lactam antibacterials J1DH 1
J1F: macrolides, lincosamides and streptogramins J1FA 1
J1M: quinolone antibacterials J1MA 3
J1X: other antibacterials J1XX 2
J2A: antimycotics for systemic use J2AX 2
J5A: direct acting antivirals J5AE 3
J5AF 3
J5AG 1
J5AH 2
J5AX 1
                                                                                                                                                                      
Lebanon, Peru, Tunisia, Uruguay, and Venezuela), our model estimation is based on 1,711 molecule-country pairs. This 
number is higher than 1,581 (2,045 – (58 molecules*8 countries)) because some of the right-censored observations overlap 
with the molecule-country observations for which regulatory information is missing. 
10
 The number in ATC1 and ATC3 refers to the categorization level. The third level ATC code (ATC3) gives a more 
specific drug categorization than the first level ATC code (ATC1). 
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ATC1: R Respiratory system 7
R3B: other drugs for obstructive airway diseases, inhalants R3BB 1
R3D: other systemic drugs for obstructive airway diseases R3DC 1
R6A: antihistamines for systemic use R6AX 5
Table 1: Overview of the categories in our sample
III.4.2 Variables 
The launch lag (also called launch window and denoted as LWij) of molecule i in country j is 
operationalized as the difference (in months) between the month in which the drug was launched in the 
first country worldwide and the month in which the drug was launched in country j (Danzon et al., 
2005). The month of launch is the first month in which sales of the new drug are non-zero. If a drug i
is launched for the first time worldwide in January 2001 in country X and it is launched subsequently 
in country Y in June 2001, the launch lag of drug i in country X is equal to zero months and the launch 
lag of drug i in country Y is equal to five months. The launch price (LPij) of molecule i in country j is 
the natural logarithm of the ex manufacturer price at launch (the selling price charged by the 
manufacturer to the wholesaler) in U.S. dollars per gram. All the molecules in our data were launched 
for the first time within the period 02/94 to 06/08. However, not all molecules are launched in all 50 
countries by the end of our observation window. In other words, our data contain right-censored 
observations.  
We control for a parsimonious set of variables that can be categorized as country-related (regulation, 
economy, demography, and culture) and drug-related (competition, the drug manufacturer’s home 
country, the drug’s defined daily dosage, and the drug’s anatomical therapeutic class) variables. 
While the regulatory environment is intrinsically complex, with subtle differences across countries, 
empirical analysis demands a clear-cut operationalization of the regulatory environment (e.g. Kyle, 
2007; Stremersch & Lemmens, 2009; Vernon, Golec, & Keener Hughen, 2006). We measure the 
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regulatory environment by six variables, selected on the basis of prior research (e.g. Kyle, 2007) and 
their prominence in practitioner journals (Kanavos, 2001; PhRMA, 2004): 
· Ex-manufacturer price regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a direct restriction of 
price levels by the regulator (Heuer, Mejer, & Neuhaus, 2007; Kyle, 2007), denoted 
REGPRICECONTROLj;
· Profit control regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a threshold on the profits 
pharmaceutical companies can obtain, denoted REGPROFITj; 
· Cross-country reference pricing regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a requirement 
to submit information by the manufacturer on drug prices in other countries (Dukes, Haaijer-
Ruskamp, de Jonckheere, & Rietveld, 2003), denoted REGCROSSj.
· Therapeutic reference pricing regulation: whether health regulators generate a reference price 
for a cluster of drugs that have therapeutic similarities (=1) or not (=0), above which price the 
patient is surcharged (Danzon & Ketcham, 2003), denoted REGREFj; 
· Pharmaco-economic evidence regulation: whether health regulators ask for some proof of the 
drug’s cost effectiveness before launch (=1) or not (=0) (Dickson, Hurst, & Jacobzone, 2003; 
Dukes et al. 2003; Garber & Phelps, 1997), denoted REGPHARMACOj;
· Strength of patent protection: an index ranging from 0 to 5 for each country, from weak to 
strong patent protection (Ginarte & Park, 1997; Park & Wagh, 2000), denoted REGPATENTj.
We expect all regulatory variables to affect both launch lag and launch price, with the exception of the 
sixth variable. There is no reason to expect a direct effect of the strength of patent protection on launch 
price. We gathered information on these six regulatory variables from reports by pharmaceutical 
companies (e.g. Novartis, 2004), OECD (Jacobzone, 2000) and Urch publishing (Urch, 2001a and 
2001b, 2002, and 2005), as well as personal conversations with countries’ health ministries. 
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With regard to the economic variables, economic wealth (WEALTHj) is measured by the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita in country j. We control for economic wealth effects on launch lag and 
launch price. Additionally, we include two economic variables to control for any price conversion or 
inflation effects on the launch price. The first variable is the purchasing power parity (PPPj) in country 
j that controls for the possible differences in price levels between countries due to conversion to US 
dollars. We gathered this data from the United Nations Statistics Division. The second variable is the 
inflation rate (INFLj) in country j. This data was extracted from the Worldbank.  
As to demographics, we control for population size (POPj), measured by the natural logarithm 
transformation of the number of inhabitants of country j. This demographic variable is expected to 
influence the launch lag but not launch price. We consider the values of the above-mentioned country 
characteristics in the year of launch of drug i in country j, given that these characteristics are time-
varying by nature. 
To control for a country’s culture, we use three dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980 and 2001): 
uncertainty avoidance (UAIj), masculinity (MASj), and individualism (IDVj). Whereas these three 
cultural variables could influence a manufacturer’s willingness to enter a country and possibly the 
price negotiations, we find no theoretical reason to assume that Hofstede’s fourth dimension - power 
distance - would influence launch lag, nor launch price.  
To control for the effect of competition on launch lag and launch price, we constructed a Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (COMPij) for molecule i in country j, based on the IMS Health data. This index is 
constructed by summing the squared market shares ( MS ) (based on revenues) of the m molecules in 
the same ATC4 category as molecule i, at the time of launch of drug i in country j  
( å
=
=
M
m
mjij MSCOMP
1
2
). A high Herfindahl-Hirschman index indicates that there is little competition for 
drug i in country j. The home country of the company launching a specific molecule i in country j
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(HOMEij) is operationalized as a dummy variable with value 1 if the company’s headquarter is located 
in the country of launch j, and 0 if this is not the case (Danzon et al., 2005; Kyle, 2006 and 2007). We 
allow for a home country effect on both launch lag and launch price.  
We also control for several molecule-specific variables.  As such, we obtained a molecule i’s defined 
daily dosage (DDDi ) in grams from the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO defines DDD 
as the assumed average maintenance dose per day of a drug used for its main indication in adults. 
Given our operationalization of launch price in grams and the molecules’ differences in defined daily 
dosages, we control for the effect of this variable on the launch price. We also include 28 dummy 
variables for the 29 therapeutic classes (
iATC ) our molecules i belong to (see Table 1). We treat the 
therapeutic class A10BG as the base category. The inclusion of these fixed category effects is in line 
with previous research on molecule’s launch timing (Danzon et al., 2005;  Kyle, 2007;  Lanjouw, 
2005). Gregson et al. (2005) acknowledge that a country’s evaluation of the therapeutic category’s 
importance affects both launch timing and price of a new molecule in that therapeutic category. For 
example, the importance of the erectile dysfunction drug category (or other lifestyle drugs) may be 
judged differently across countries. Consequently, this evaluation will influence both launch timing 
and the launch price of any new molecule in that category.  
III.4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides an overview of the countries’ descriptives with regard to the launch lag and the 
launch prices. The first column in Table 2 contains the countries we study, classified by world region. 
These countries are ranked from early to late within world regions based on the launch lag (from early 
to late launch) in the second column. To calculate mean launch leads and lags, we used the following 
procedure. We first computed the mean launch lag for each molecule across the countries. Then, we 
subtracted this mean launch lag of the molecule from each country-specific launch lag for that 
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molecule. Third, we averaged these country-specific launch lags over all molecules launched in each 
specific country to obtain mean leads and lags for each specific country. A mean lead (-) indicates that 
drugs are typically launched early in a country, while a mean lag (+) indicates that drugs are typically 
launched late in a country. Column 3 in Table 2 shows the countries’ deviation from the mean launch 
price across molecules. To calculate these deviations, we, first, computed the mean launch price for 
each molecule across the countries. Then, within each molecule, we computed the percentage 
deviation of the country-specific price from the mean price over all countries. Finally, we averaged 
these percentage deviations for each specific country over all molecules launched in that country. A
negative deviation means that a drug is typically launched at a relatively low price in a country 
whereas a positive deviation indicates that a drug is typically launched at a relatively high price in a
country. 
Our study is the first to give an overview of both mean launch lead and lag times and mean launch 
price deviations across such a broad spectrum of categories and countries, which leads to several new 
descriptive insights. First, we find that the U.S., Germany, and Denmark experience the largest lead in 
launch. Tunisia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia experience the largest lag in launch. North America and 
Western Europe show similar (small) launch delays. Launch delays are largest in Eastern Europe, 
Africa and the Middle East. There is a marked difference in launch timing between Western Europe 
(fast) and Eastern Europe (slow), despite many of these launches having occurred recently. Japan and 
the U.S. have the largest positive deviation from the average launch price worldwide whereas Egypt, 
South Africa, and Tunisia show the largest negative deviation from the worldwide average launch 
price. North America, South America, and Asia show positive deviations from the worldwide average 
launch price, while the other world regions show a negative deviation from the average launch price 
worldwide. 
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World Region and Countries Mean Lead (-) or Lag (+) in Launch 
Window (in Months)
% Deviation from Mean Price at 
Launch per Gram 
North America -8.95 37.87
U.S. -17.17 37.79
Canada -7.50 -1.57
Puerto Rico -7.21 93.09
Mexico -3.94 22.16
Western Europe -5.81 -8.15
Germany -15.59 -9.17
Denmark -10.65 -5.35
U.K. -9.82 -0.14
Austria -9.13 -9.92
Switzerland -8.97 0.21
Ireland -8.08 -5.22
Sweden -7.11 -8.48
Netherlands -6.95 -6.93
Finland -6.44 -4.39
Norway -5.87 3.83
Spain -4.03 -17.22
Belgium -3.45 -13.61
Luxemburg -2.22 -12.78
Portugal -1.66 -11.47
Italy -1.01 -13.26
France -0.46 -12.44
Greece 2.06 -12.21
South America -0.43 7.93
Brazil -6.79 14.43
Argentina -6.36 0.89
Colombia -3.12 33.67
Chile -2.27 -8.19
Venezuela 1.97 17.49
Uruguay 3.95 12.72
Peru 4.29 -4.20
Ecuador 4.91 -3.39
Oceania 0.10 -8.02
Australia -1.55 -11.82
New Zealand 1.75 -4.21
Asia 5.16 11.01
Philippines -2.17 -12.15
Japan 6.89 47.89
Korea 10.75 -2.71
Eastern Europe 8.74 -1.62
Czech Republic 5.03 1.58
Estonia 5.21 -3.51
Hungary 5.68 -5.54
Poland 8.91 1.71
Latvia 9.55 -5.78
Slovakia 12.77 0.78
Lithuania 14.02 -0.61
Africa and the Middle East 14.51 -13.31
Kuwait 4.42 -1.81
South Africa 5.14 -26.11
United Arabic Emirates 6.49 4.33
Lebanon 6.77 -16.32
Jordan 12.37 -7.89
Egypt 17.86 -29.10
Saudi Arabia 19.40 -13.37
Morocco 20.88 -8.67
Tunisia 37.28 -20.82
Table 2: Mean lead or lag in launch window and % deviation from mean price at launch by world 
region and country 
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III.5 Model 
III.5.1 Model Description 
Let *
ijLW be the launch window (launch lag) of molecule i  in country j and let 
*
ijLP  be the 
natural logarithm transformed ex manufacturer price per gram at launch of molecule i  in country j. We 
do not always observe the actual values of *
ijLW  and 
*
ijLP  since censoring is present. Observed values 
are denoted by 
ijLW and ijLP . The vector 1ijZ contains the exogenous explanatory variables for the 
launch window equation and 
2ijZ
contains the exogenous explanatory variables for the launch price 
equation. We have the following system of two simultaneous equations: 
11
'2*
2
*
1
* )( ijijijijij uLPLPLW +++= Zdaa       (1)
22
'2*
2
*
1
* )( ijijijijij uLWLWLP +++= Zgbb       (2)  
The inclusion of the quadratic terms in (1) and (2) allows for testing of the main hypotheses H1 and 
H2.  The error terms ( 21 , ijij uu ) are allowed to have a non-zero correlation. Following Garen (1984), we 
consider *
ijLW  and 
*
ijLP  as continuous selection variables. Indeed, the firm and the regulator may both 
select the launch lag with the goal of influencing the launch price, and the level of launch price with 
the goal of influencing the launch lag. The omitted variables in 1iju  include non-observable strategic 
variables used by the firm and the regulator to select the optimal value of *ijLW . One may expect that 
these strategic variables are (i) correlated with the launch price and (ii) correlated with the effect that 
launch price has on launch lag. The omitted variables in 2iju  then include non-observable strategic 
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variables used by the firm and the regulator to select the optimal value of *
ijLP . Similarly, one may 
expect that these strategic variables are (i) correlated with the launch window and (ii) correlated with 
the effect that launch window has on launch price. Hence, as in Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) and 
Wooldridge (2002), we make the coefficients of *
ijLP in equation (1) and the coefficients of 
*
ijLW in
equation (2) random: 
111 ija ea +=          (3a) 
222 ija ea +=          (3b) 
and 
111 ijb wb +=          (4a) 
222 ijb wb +=          (4b) 
Potential endogeneity is then accounted for by allowing 1iju   ( 2iju ) to be (i) correlated with  
*
ijLP (
*
ijLW ) and (ii) correlated with 1ije ( 1ijw ) and 2ije ( 2ijw ). All these error terms are assumed to be 
jointly normal and are possibly correlated. Equation (1) can now be written as 
1
2*
2
*
11
'2*
2
*
1
* )()( ijijijijijijijijij uLPLPLPaLPaLW +++++= eed Z    (5) 
while equation (2) can be written as 
2
2*
2
*
12
'2*
2
*
1
* )()( ijijijijijijijijij uLWLWLWbLWbLP +++++= wwg Z ,   (6) 
being of a similar form as in Garen (1984). The interaction terms between the residuals ije and ijLP ,
and ijw and ijLW , respectively, are a feature of the Garen (1988) estimator allowing to model 
unobserved heterogeneity associated with different levels of the selection variables. Censoring occurs 
for the molecule-country combinations for which we do not observe a launch at the end of our 
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observation window, June 2008.  Denote ijC  the censoring time, being the time between the end of the 
observation period and the molecule-country specific launch date. For the observed launch window, 
we have that 
*
ijij LWLW =    if ijij CLW £
*
,       (7a) 
ijij CLW =   otherwise.       (7b) 
Furthermore, the launch price ijLP  is only observed on the selected sample for which ijij CLW £
* , and 
there *
ijij LPLP = .
III.5.2 Model Estimation 
We estimate the system of equations (1) and (2) in two steps, similar to a two-stage least 
VTXDUHVprocedure. Besides endogeneity, we have the additional problem of censoring, which we address 
XVLQJthe same procedure as in Vella (1993). To estimate the launch lag equation (1), we first estimate 
WKHfollowing reduced form of the launch price equation 
LP
ijijLPijLP u+G= 3
'*
Z ,          (8) 
with 3ijZ  containing at least 1 variable that is not in 1ijZ (we take ‘defined daily dosage’, ‘purchasing 
power parity’ and ‘inflation’ as exogenous variables affecting launch price, but not launch window). 
This equation needs to be estimated using only those observations that are not censored ( )1=ijd . To 
correct for this sample selection bias, we use the Heckit estimator for estimating the parameter '
LPG  in 
(8).  
For the estimation of the structural launch window equation, we need the generalized residual of the 
reduced launch price equation (8). This generalized residual (e.g. Gourieroux, Monfort, & Renault, 
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1987) is defined as LPn = E[
LP
iju |LP ij , ijd =1] and equals here LPn = LPij - 3
'
ijZG , which can be estimated 
by replacing G  by its estimate.  From equation (5), it then follows that 
E[ *ijLW |
*
ijLP , ijd =1]=
2
3211
'2
21 ** ijLPijLPLPijijij LPLPLPaLPa nfnfnfd +++++ Z , (9)
where we used that E[ 1iju |
*
ijLP , ijd =1]=E[E[ 1iju |
LP
iju ]|
*
ijLP , ijd =1]= LPnf1  since  
E[ 1iju |
LP
iju ] is a linear function of 
LP
iju ,  due to the normality assumption. Similarly for the terms in 1ije
and 2ije .
To estimate the launch price equation (2) in a structural form, we consider the following reduced form 
of the launch window equation 
LW
ijijLWijLW u+G= 4
'*
Z ,         (10)  
with 4ijZ  containing at least 1 variable that is not in 2ijZ (we take ‘strength of patent protection’, and 
‘population size’ as exogenous variables determining launch lag, but not launch price11).  The censored 
regression Tobit model (10) can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation, using both censored 
and non-censored observations. For estimation of the launch price equation (2), we can only use the 
observations that are not censored ( )1=ijd . As before, it follows from equation (6) that 
E[
*
ijLP |
*
ijLW , ijd =1]=
2
3212
'2
21 ** ijLWijLWLWijijij LWLWLWbLWb nqnqnqg +++++ Z ,  (11)
with 
LWn = E[
LW
iju |LW ij , ijd =1]= LWij - 1
'
ijZG the generalized residual, which can be estimated by 
replacing 
'
LWG  by the maximum likelihood Tobit estimator (Vella 1993).  
Replacing the vectors 1ijZ  (in equation 1) and 2ijZ  (in equation 2) by the exogenous variables leads 
then to equation (12) and equation (13), respectively 
                                                
11
 We find no conceptual reasoning nor empirical evidence for the direct effect of these variables on launch price. 
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In the remainder of the paper, we call the generalized residuals  
LPn  and  LWn  the selectivity variables.
Since the error terms in (12) and (13) are intrinsically heteroscedastic, the standard errors of the OLS 
estimator of both equations are computed with the White heteroscedasticity-correction. For ease of 
interpretation, and since they turned out to have no explanatory power, the highest order interactions 
terms between the selectivity variables and the selection variables are dropped from the model (
3q = 3f
= 0). 
III.6 Results 
In Table 3, we present the explanatory variables in the first column. We report the parameter 
estimates of the launch lag model and the standard errors in the second and third column, respectively. 
The fourth and fifth column in Table 3 represent the parameter estimates of the launch price model and 
the standard errors, respectively. The R-squared of the launch lag model is 0.25 which is an acceptable 
fit in comparison with for example Lanjouw (2005). The R-squared of the launch price model is 0.66.  
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Launch Window 
Model
Launch Price 
Model
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Constant ( 0d , 0g ) 58.65*** 10.86 3.14*** 0.65
Launch Price (a1) -4.16*** 1.32
Launch Price² (a2) 0.37*** 0.14
Selectivity Variable ( 1f ) 0.40 1.06
Selectivity Variable*Launch Price ( 2f ) -0.11 0.18
Launch Lag (b1) 0.04*** 0.01
Launch Lag*Launch Lag (b2) -0.001*** 0.00
Selectivity Variable ( 1q ) -19.47* 10.76
Selectivity Variable*Launch Lag ( 2q ) 0.66*** 0.22
Regulation
Ex Manufacturer Price Regulation ( 1d , 1g ) 3.97*** 1.16 -0.13 0.10
Profit Control Regulation ( 2d , 2g ) 5.36*** 1.31 -0.07 0.13
Cross-Country Reference Pricing Regulation ( 3d , 3g ) -1.12 1.41 0.00 0.12
Therapeutic Reference Pricing Regulation ( 4d , 4g ) 0.68 0.89 -0.12 0.09
Pharmaco-Economic Evidence Regulation ( 5d , 5g ) 0.52 0.99 -0.08 0.09
Strength of Patent Protection ( 6d ) -3.18*** 1.02 / /
Economy
Economic Wealth ( 7d , 6g ) -0.47 0.76 0.07 0.07
Purchasing Power Parity ( 7g ) / / 0.00 0.00
Inflation ( 8g ) / / 0.01 0.01
Demography
Population Size ( 8d ) -1.07*** 0.40 / /
Culture
Uncertainty Avoidance ( 9d , 9g ) 0.11*** 0.03 -0.00 0.00
Masculinity ( 10d , 10g ) 0.06*** 0.02 -0.00 0.00
Individualism ( 11d , 11g ) -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.00
Competition ( 12d , 12g ) (Reverse-scored) -1.20 3.02 0.69*** 0.29
Firm's Home Country ( 13d , 13g ) -6.84*** 1.65 0.58*** 0.25
Defined Daily Dosage ( 14g ) / / -3.02*** 0.20
Anatomical Therapeutic Classes ( ix , iz ) * ***
N 1,711 1,711
R-Squared 0.25 0.66
Significance levels (two-sided): *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
S.E.: standard error; /  indicates that the variable in the first column is not part of the model 
Table 3: Results for the launch window and launch price model 
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We first discuss the results of the launch lag model and we then turn to the results of the launch price 
model. Consistent with hypothesis 1 (H1), we find a U-shaped effect of launch price on launch 
window (a1 = -4.16, p<0.01 and a2 = 0.37, p<0.01). This relation is depicted graphically in Figure 1, 
based on the full model coefficients, and within our observation window
12
. The values of the 
exogenous variables are set at their average value across the sample. Figure 1 shows that on average, 
the launch lag is smallest at a launch price of 245 U.S. dollars per gram (Ln(launch price) = 5.5). As 
prices may vary dramatically across molecules, we also calculate the average percentage price 
deviation (cfr. Table 2) at which the launch lag is smallest, which is 6.65%. Thus, the launch lag is 
smallest at a launch price of 6.65% above the average launch price.  
Figure 1: The U-shaped effect of launch price on launch lag 
With regard to regulation, there are two regulatory constraints that influence the launch lag 
significantly and positively: the direct control of the ex manufacturer price regulation (
1d = 3.97, 
p<0.01), and profit control regulation (
2d = 5.36, p<0.01). The first result is in line with findings by 
Kyle (2007) and Heuer et al. (2007). Pharmaceutical companies prefer to enter countries that do not 
put a stringent restriction on the negotiable price earlier than countries that do. The presence of such a 
                                                
12
The horizontal axis becomes negative because the launch price per gram in U.S. dollars is Ln-transformed.  
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regulation can also lead to longer negotiation processes. As to the second result, profit contribution by 
new products is considered to be large (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; Wuyts et al., 2004), but profit 
regulation caps overall profit margins. In countries with profit control there is no incentive for firms to 
launch their newly developed drugs early, as compared to sustain their mature drugs (Rapp & Lloyd, 
1994). A third regulatory variable, strength of patent protection (
6d = -3.18, p<0.01), affects launch 
window negatively. Strong patent protection encourages pharmaceutical firms to enter relatively early, 
as their period of exclusivity once they have entered is more strongly protected. 
Economic wealth does not significantly influence the launch lag (although it does have the expected 
sign). A reason for this may be that the countries’ GDP per capita does not fully capture countries’ 
affordability (Tellis et al., 2003), and thus does not capture the bigger market opportunity in wealthier 
countries.  Furthermore, launch occurs earlier in countries with a larger population (
8d = -1.07, 
p<0.01), as they are likely to contain more people suffering from a specific disease, than countries 
with a smaller population.  
The cultural variables uncertainty avoidance (
9d = 0.11, p<0.01) and masculinity ( 10d = 0.06, p<0.01) 
significantly and positively influence the launch lag. As customers in highly uncertainty avoidant 
countries perceive more uncertainty in new products (Michaut, 2004) and see novel ideas as more 
dangerous (Hofstede, 1980), pharmaceutical companies will enter these countries relatively late. 
Launch also occurs later in masculine countries, as in such markets the use of drugs may be perceived 
as a weakness and a cause for shame (Weber, Roberts, & McDougall Jr., 2000), limiting a new drugs’ 
market potential. 
Competition in the category the new drug is entering does not significantly influence the launch lag.
Furthermore, drugs are launched faster in the company’s home country (
13d = -6.84, p<0.01). 
Pharmaceutical companies’ larger familiarity with the home market’s therapeutic needs or health 
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regulator’s favoritism towards these pharmaceutical companies may possibly explain this result (Kyle, 
2006). Finally, the therapeutic category dummies are jointly significant (p<0.10); we do not report 
specific estimates for reasons of brevity (available from authors upon request).  
Turning to the launch price equation, we find support for hypothesis 2 (H2). We find an inverted U-
shaped effect of launch lag on launch price (b1 = 0.04, p<0.01 and b2 = -0.001, p<0.01). This relation 
is depicted graphically in Figure 2 (based on the full model coefficients; the values of launch lag on 
the horizontal axis of Figure 2 remain within our observation window). Figure 2 shows that a launch 
lag of 48 months is associated with the highest launch price. Because of the lag between the initial 
research on a compound that could become a drug, and the drug actually entering the market, 
Grabowski and Kyle (2007) estimate a drug’s average market exclusivity period to be approximately 
11 years, but with a high variance surrounding this value. The launch lag of 48 months thus seems to 
be a realistic time point, after which pharmaceutical companies start conceding on lower prices, to still 
obtain some return on their R&D investment.  
Figure 2: The inverted U-shaped effect of launch window on launch price 
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Surprisingly, regulatory restrictions do not significantly influence launch price. The lack of 
explanatory power may be due to the following reasons: 1) the ex-manufacturer price regulation may 
have a larger effect on prices of mature drugs than of newly launched drugs (Stremersch & Lemmens, 
2009); 2) the profit thresholds are not stringent enough to directly influence launch prices; 3) the cross-
country reference pricing dummy does not capture the true effect on price as that effect may heavily 
depend on the specific group of reference countries; 4) reference pricing influences the reimbursement 
level of a drug rather than its launch price; 5) pharmaco-economic evidence’s effect on price may not 
only be positive, but may also turn out to be negative for some drugs, e.g. those with a weak scientific 
profile.  
Whereas we may expect that higher economic wealth translates into higher affordability, and thus 
higher willingness to pay (Wagner & McCarthy, 2004), we do not find any evidence for this. As 
mentioned before, a society’s co-payment system may drive willingness to pay, rather than the GDP 
per capita level. Purchasing power parity and the inflation rate are not significant, which shows that 
our launch price measure is not biased by conversion rates, nor by inflation. A country’s culture does 
not influence the launch price of a new drug either. 
Competition influences launch price significantly (
12g = 0.69, p<0.01). A new molecule that faces 
stronger competition obtains a lower price than a new molecule that enters a category with weaker 
competition. The presence of close substitutes provides health regulators with more bargaining power 
(Ekelund & Persson, 2003; Lu & Comanor, 1998). Firms obtain higher launch prices in their domestic 
market than in foreign markets (
13g = 0.58, p<0.01). This effect may be driven by the home country’s 
national and industrial policy towards domestic firms, e.g. to support domestic R&D (Wagner & 
McCarthy, 2004). The defined daily dosage has a significant negative effect (
14g = -3.02, p<0.01) on 
launch price. This effect is caused by the operationalization of our launch prices in US dollars per 1 
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gram of the molecule. However, not all drugs require the same daily dosage. A drug of which the 
patient needs a high (e.g. 10g), rather than low (e.g. 0,1 mg), dosage is typically less expensive when 
expressed per gram. The therapeutic category dummies are also jointly significant (p<0.01) in the 
launch price equation. 
As to the selectivity variables, we find that the coefficients of these variables in the launch lag 
equation (
1f  and 2f ) are non-significant, which indicates that firms nor regulators select the launch 
price to influence the launch lag. The coefficients of the selectivity variables in the launch price 
equation, however, (
1q = -19.47, p<0.10 and 2q = 0.66, p<0.01) are both significant, which suggests 
that the launch window is selected to influence the launch price. A launch window that is higher than 
what could be expected based on the observed explanatory variables, will cause a lower launch price 
(based on the negative sign of 
1q ). Furthermore, this strategic choice of the launch lag differs 
depending on the level of launch lag and its effect gets less pronounced for higher levels of the launch 
lag (based on 
2q ’s positive sign). Both effects point at the use of launch lag as a strategic instrument 
of regulators to pressure manufacturers to concede on a relatively low launch price, but the 
effectiveness of this instrument decreases as the launch is increasingly delayed. 
Our results are robust to sample composition, which we tested by estimating our model when leaving 
out specific therapeutic categories. We also did extensive outlier analyses (on both launch lag and 
price), which confirmed that our main results are highly robust. Before estimating our final model, we 
ran simpler analyses in which we only included our focal variables (launch lag and launch price) and 
therapeutic category dummies. The U-shaped and the inverted U-shaped effects were significant. We 
then ran analyses in which we included our focal variables and 1 specific group of explanatory 
variables (e.g. regulation and culture). Our results remained highly robust. Furthermore, we checked 
whether our quadratic specification of launch lag and launch price provided us with the best possible 
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fit. Both a linear and cubic specification of launch lag in our launch price model and of launch price in 
our launch window model gave a worse fit (when accounting for the number of parameters). Instead of 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as the competition measure, we included the number of 
competitors. The interpretation remained the same and results stayed robust (we could not include both 
competition measures as their correlation is 0.82). We also checked whether adding the size of the 
population aged older than 15 years instead of the total population size changed our results and it did 
not. We checked whether adding the fourth dimension of Hofstede, power distance, changed our 
results but found power distance to be nonsignificant and the other results to remain the same. Finally, 
we ran the analyses for each ATC1 category separately. The effects of the interrelationship between 
launch lag and launch price were significant in the majority of the analyses and they confirmed the 
hypothesized direction. The limited number of observations per category in these analyses could be the 
reason for not finding significant results in some cases. 
III.7 Discussion 
This paper yields interesting insights in the complex phenomenon of international launch 
behavior by pharmaceutical firms and their interaction with health regulators. International launch 
price has a U-shaped effect on launch lag whereas the international launch lag has an inverted U-
shaped effect on launch price, assumingly driven by the negotiation process between pharmaceutical 
companies and health regulators. These findings give insights to managers and public policy makers, 
while the limitations of our work yield opportunities for future research. 
III.7.1 Implications 
International launch lag and price have an important impact on companies’ bottom line (Danzon 
et al., 2005; Wagner & McCarthy, 2004). Stremersch and Lemmens (2009) showed that launch 
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window of pharmaceuticals does not influence the sales pattern. However, as we show that launch lag 
and launch price are interrelated, launch lag will influence the revenues of firms through launch price. 
The contribution of our results to pharmaceutical firms primarily lies in enhancing their understanding 
of international launch window and price patterns. The patterns we find, inform firms on launch lags 
and prices that are common across countries in our sample. This information allows them to build 
more realistic expectations on market entry.  
Our research can also inform public policy administrators on launch windows and launch prices, both 
of which are relevant to their health policy. Popular press sometimes points at individual cases on how 
a drug was launched late in a country or how the price of a specific drug is more expensive as 
compared to other countries. For example, the anti-allergy drug Xyzall has been launched in the U.S. 
with a significant delay in comparison to many other countries (Global Insight, 2007). The price of 
Pfizer’s statin Lipitor is €0.60 in Paris (France) whereas the price of that same pill was $3.98 in 
Philadelphia (the U.S.) (Business Week, 2003). Typically, such stories in the popular press are very 
much based on a single case. For every single country, we can come up with at least one drug that was 
introduced very late or priced very highly. The popular press typically generalizes much beyond the 
single case they cite to make inference on the country’s health policy, often to support criticism on the 
latter. This study provides public policy analysts with more quantitative evidence on a broad sample of 
countries and categories.  
Furthermore, our results can give insights into hypothetical situations. For example, Lipitor 
(atorvastatin) in Belgium had a launch lag of 15 months. If the launch of Lipitor occurred six months 
earlier, its launch price in Belgium would have been 15.36% (S.E. = 4.19%) lower than its actual 
launch price. Thus, health regulators would have not only increased patients’ accessibility by granting 
earlier access but they also would have managed to achieve a lower price level. Pharmaceutical 
companies accept such lower price because they get more time to recoup their R&D investment. Based 
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on Belgium’s first year revenues of 18.3 million dollars, this price decrease would have translated in a 
2.8 million dollar saving for the health regulator in the first year after launch. In contrast, when Lipitor 
would have been introduced in Belgium with a launch lag of 21 months, the launch price would have 
increased with 22.05% (S.E. = 5.28%).   
III.7.2 Limitations and Further Research 
First, our results are context-specific as the focus is on the pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, 
one should exert caution in generalizing beyond this research context. Whereas one can argue that this 
creates a narrow appeal, one should consider the substantive importance of this industry and topic 
(Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009). Second, one can easily critique the operationalization of the 
regulatory environment given the complexity of regulatory health systems worldwide. Stremersch and 
Lemmens (2009) look at the effect of regulation (operationalized in a similar way) on sales across the 
product life cycle of drugs. Although data appear to be similar, this paper contains a larger set of 
molecules and countries. In addition, regulation only serves as a control in our context. No core 
variables are thus similar between Stremersch and Lemmens (2009) and this paper. Operationalizing 
the regulatory context across countries in more detail, while challenging, could be insightful. Third, 
while we provide evidence for variation in drugs’ availability in countries and drugs’ launch prices, we 
do not have data on the price patients actually pay (the level of “co-pay”). Even if a drug’s price is 
low, patients in some countries can still be excluded from access to this drug, because of the level of 
co-pay. Data on how much patients actually co-pay across countries would add insights, but to our 
knowledge, this data is unavailable at the drug-country level. Fourth, whereas we operationalize 
launch as the first month in which sales are non-zero, there are other ways of operationalizing launch 
timing when looking at the sales curve. In line with the philosophy presented by Van den Bulte (2000) 
on diffusion acceleration, we could operationalize launch as the moment in which 5% market 
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penetration is achieved. However, in our context, this is very challenging as we have no good 
reference points, because incidence rates are not available for such a large sample of drugs and 
countries. Whereas Van den Bulte (2000) uses that measure for reasons of disagreement on launch 
dates, our data source IMS Health is very trustworthy and therefore, our launch timing measures are 
reliable. Fifth, in addition to looking at launch prices, the price patterns over time of branded 
molecules worldwide could provide interesting insights, both before and after the patent expiration 
period (when branded and non-branded generics enter the market). Price-spillovers across countries 
were not included in this paper but could also provide an interesting future research avenue. Finally, 
additional insights could be obtained from exploring moderators of the relationship between launch lag 
and launch price. Specific characteristics of the pharmaceutical firms launching the drug (such as firm 
size which could be a proxy for negotiation power) could influence this relationship as well as country 
characteristics.  
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Chapter 4 
International Spill-Overs in Pharmaceutical Pricing: 
The Role of Geography, Trade, and Regulation
13
IV.1 Abstract 
Based on the price pattern over time of 16 pharmaceuticals across 39 countries, this study shows 
that price spill-overs exist across international pharmaceutical markets. Geographically close countries 
and countries that share a strong trade relationship have more similar prices than geographically 
distant countries or countries that share a weak trade relationship. Interestingly, the presence of cross-
country reference pricing regulation may not always enhance international price spill-overs, as 
companies may adjust their launch sequence within the reference set to circumvent such regulation. 
Pharmaceutical companies need to account for the international price spill-overs we identify in their 
pricing decisions, such that they reach a price across all countries that maximizes their total profits.  
IV.2 Introduction 
Pricing is often controversial in industries of societal importance, such as utilities (e.g. energy 
prices), telecommunication (e.g. fixed line service fees) and medicine (e.g. drug prices). The 
affordability to all citizens of such products may be a concern, which is often a cause for government 
intervention in price setting in such markets. Prices may show wide variation across international 
markets, generating a sense of inequity in high-price markets. Therefore, governments compare prices 
across international markets to evaluate their public policies. Prices in such markets are typically set 
after negotiations between firm and regulator (Verniers et al. 2009).  
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 This chapter is based upon a paper with the same title co-authored by Stremersch, Stefan and Lemmens, Aurélie. We 
acknowledge the data support by IMS Health.  
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While marketing scholars have extensively investigated pricing (e.g. Bijmolt, van Heerde, and Pieters 
2005; Bronnenberg, Mela, and Boulding 2006; Nijs, Dekimpe, Steenkamp, and Hanssens 2001; 
Srinivasan, Pauwels, Hanssens, and Dekimpe 2002; van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, and Pauwels 2008), 
international pricing in highly regulated markets remains understudied (for an exception, see 
Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005). Consider the controversy among industry and public policy 
representatives on pharmaceutical pricing in international markets – the context of the current study. 
Industry executives claim that the high risks they take to develop new drugs are no longer rewarded 
with a sufficiently high price in many international markets (Capell 2003; Jack 2007 ;Wall Street 
Journal 2006). Sufficiently high price levels are however necessary to guarantee a society’s access to 
innovative lifesaving drugs in the future (Santerre and Vernon 2005). Economists support this claim 
by showing that innovation is threatened by low price levels (Dimasi, Hansen, and Grabowski 2003). 
On the other hand, public policy observers claim that companies’ selling prices greatly exceed the 
production costs and therefore often conclude that these companies are simply making excessive 
profits (Coy 2001). Many of them often refer to firms’ international pricing policies and the inequity 
of charging similar patients different prices for the same drug and indication across different markets 
(Danzon and Chao 2000). These price differences on a worldwide level have been the cause for 
parallel trade, which occurs when a third party purchases drugs in lower priced countries and then 
resells them in higher priced countries.   
As a consequence, scholars have turned their interest to international pharmaceutical pricing over the 
last decade. They described the variation in price regulation across countries (Huttin 1999), price 
evolution over time (Lu and Comanor 1998; Ekelund and Persson 2003) and price disparities between 
US and a selection of other countries (Berndt 2000; Danzon and Chao 2000; Danzon and Furukawa 
2003 and 2006; Danzon and Kim 1998). Chintagunta and Desiraju (2005) estimated cross-country 
price (and detailing) competition for 3 antidepressants across 5 countries. Verniers et al. (2009) 
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estimated the influence of international launch timing and country regulation on launch price for 54 
drugs across 50 countries.  
While prior studies inventoried variation in regulation and price patterns across international 
pharmaceutical markets, the present paper identifies the extent to which the price of a drug in one 
country has a relation with the price of the same drug in other countries. We study existence of such 
price spill-overs across 39 national markets for 16 new molecules in 4 different therapeutic categories 
across 173 months (between 2/1994 and 6/2008). Different reasons for cross-country spill-overs of 
price may lie in the geographical closeness of countries, the trade relationship countries have and the 
extent to which countries enforce a cross-country reference pricing system. Governments often see 
price spill-over as a way to reduce or maintain drug prices at justifiable levels. To stimulate such spill-
over, many (European) governments have regulation in place by which they demand of the 
manufacturer to submit prices in the other countries in which their drug is available. Governments and 
insurers (commonly referred to as “payers”) consequently consider such prices in other countries in the 
price negotiations they have with the firm for their own country’s prices.  Managers need to account 
for price spill-over, as agreeing to a too low price in one country may “infect” the price levels they 
obtain in other countries, and thus impact the global profits they obtain.  
While the international price spill-over we identify is new to marketing, it adds to the increasing 
interest international marketing scholars have developed on interdependencies between countries. For 
example, from a supply side perspective, Gielens and Dekimpe (2007) and Mitra and Golder (2002) 
showed that the decision to establish a subsidiary in a foreign country is not only driven by the 
characteristics of that country but that decision is also dependent on that foreign country’s similarity 
(i.e. tie) to the firm’s home market or to the markets in which the firm already operates. From a 
demand side perspective, van Everdingen, Fok and Stremersch (2009) showed that intercountry 
distances (or ties) moderate the relationship between the moment of takeoff in a focal country and the 
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prior takeoffs in other countries. Albuquerque, Bronnenberg, and Corbett (2007) examined how the 
adoption of an innovation by a firm in a specific country is influenced by ties with a “neighbor set” of 
countries. Still other studies showed that geographical, economic, and cultural distance help explain 
diffusion similarities across the world (Ganesh and Kumar 1996; Ganesh et al. 1997; Kumar, Ganesh 
and Echambadi 1998; Putsis et al. 1997; Stremersch and Tellis 2004; Takada and Jain 1991; Tellis, 
Stremersch, and Yin 2003).  
IV.3 Conceptual Background 
Pharmaceutical prices are often set after negotiation between payers (governments or insurers) 
and pharmaceutical companies. In such negotiations, firms have an ask price, often documented with 
clinical studies on cost effectiveness. Public policy tries to limit the pharmaceutical companies’ ask 
price, dependent on the strength of the regulations in each country (Danzon, Wang, and Wang 2005). 
Public policy makers’ offer price may be influenced by prices that have already been obtained for the 
same drug in other countries. A formal system through which governments do this is external 
reference price regulation (Gregson, Sparrowhawk, Mauskopf, and Paul 2005). Under such regulation, 
negotiations may refer to current or prior (usually up to 6 months) prices in other countries where the 
drug is on the market. Price negotiations underlie the launch price of a new drug in a country, but may 
take place at any time after launch. Some governments (e.g. the Netherlands) define specific time 
intervals at which drug prices are renegotiated, others may start such renegotiations ad hoc, e.g. 
because of budgetary pressures.  
Chapter IV 93
IV.3.1 Cross-Country Spill-Overs in Pharmaceutical Pricing 
There are two main reasons why pharmaceutical prices may spill over from one geographic 
market to another. First, drug arbitrage or gray markets
14
 may occur when one market has a 
substantially lower price than another market. Price differentials are the only true reason for gray 
markets (Onkvisit and Shaw 1989, p. 205). Such arbitrage is more intense if markets are 
geographically close or share an intense trade relationship. Second, regulators may use prices in other 
markets as a reference price in price negotiations with firms in their own market.  
Next, we discuss in more detail the reasons why geographical closeness, international trade and the 
presence of a cross-country reference pricing system may lead to international spill-over in pricing. 
IV.3.1.1 Geographical Closeness 
Geographical closeness refers to the geographical proximity between two countries, more in 
particular, the countries’ capitals (e.g. Albuquerque et al. 2007, van Everdingen et al. 2009). 
Bronnenberg and Albuquerque (2002) emphasize that geography is an important element of marketing 
strategy. In case countries are geographically close, spill-over may occur more often than in case 
countries are geographically distant, for three reasons. First, regulators may be more sensitive to 
nearby markets in assessing whether a price proposed by a pharmaceutical firm is justifiable or not, 
than to distant markets. Knowledge spill-over is geographically localized (Lee 2009) and spill-over on 
pricing knowledge may occur in the same way. In many public policy decisions, governments often 
refer to policies in neighboring countries or countries that belong to the same geographic bloc (e.g. 
free trade  zones, currency zones, etc.). However, the influence of neighboring countries is not 
necessarily formalized in a cross-country reference pricing system. Such referencing to neighboring 
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 This occurs when an intermediary sources a product from a low-priced market and sells it in the high-priced market 
(Antia, Berger, Dutta, and Fisher 2006).  Synonyms are: parallel trade and parallel import. 
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countries’ policies may provide easy justification to the public for policy decisions, given inhabitants 
see the countries as similar.  
Second, firms will typically have pan-regional management structures in which multiple countries that 
are geographically close fall under one management team and one organization. Within such 
organization information may be easier shared than across geographic units (Chaudry and Walsch 
1995). Also, clinical trials and application procedures may be more aligned within a geographic zone 
(e.g. EU) than across geographic zones (e.g. EU-US). Within the EU, there is one regulatory body 
(i.e., EMEA) to which companies submit drug information and in which countries share information. 
These prices may spill over to a greater extent within a region than across regions.  
Third, if prices differ between geographic locations, consumers may travel to buy medicine in 
neighboring countries. Many European countries now see this behavior in their border zones. The 
Internet has further enabled consumers to buy in other countries, especially if they are close to their 
home country, given lower shipment costs. Thus, we also expect that consumer buying in other 
countries lead to price spill-over between countries that are geographically close. 
Moreover, the extent to which prices spill over among geographically close countries may increase 
over the life cycle of the drug. In the beginning of the life cycle, drugs may not yet be available in 
neighboring countries, excluding any possible price spill-over. Moreover, consumers only learn 
gradually of such price differences and the arbitrage opportunity they represent. In consequence, 
buying by consumers in neighboring countries will only develop gradually over time. Governments 
may also feel more price pressure with mature drugs than with new drugs. This reasoning resembles 
the idea in a cross-country learning context in which the lag countries (in which a product is 
introduced at a later timing) will experience more external influences (Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 
2000a and 2000b; Eliashberg and Helsen 1996; Ganesh, Kumar, and Subramanian 1997; Kumar and 
Krishnan 2002). Consequently, the usage of prices in neighboring countries to enforce lower prices 
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from pharmaceutical companies may be more prominent when drugs reach maturity than when they 
just enter the market.   
IV.3.1.2 Economic Trade 
Some countries trade more intensively with one another than others (Disdier and Head 2008). 
Therefore, economic trade has been a variable often studied in international marketing (Albuquerque 
et al. 2007; van Everdingen et al. 2009). In our particular application, especially the imports in one 
country from another may deserve attention. In case pharmaceutical prices are low in country X, as 
compared to country Y, and intense trade relationships exist from X to Y, parallel trade of drugs from 
the low price country X to the high price country Y are likely to develop faster than when such trade 
relationships are absent (Kyle 2007a). Such trade is heavily regulated in some geographic areas (e.g. 
imports of drugs from Canada to the U.S.) or completely free in other areas (e.g. drug trade in the 
European Union).  
Just like consumers, we expect professional, international traders to only gradually learn of drug price 
disparities across countries and how to benefit from them.  Thus, more intense trade from low price to 
high price countries will develop as drugs mature. On the other hand, we do expect professional 
traders to discover arbitrage opportunities much faster than consumers. The latter would entail that 
trade is already intense when drugs are new and does not become more intense as drugs mature. 
IV.3.1.3 Cross-Country Reference Pricing 
Cross-country reference pricing has been introduced by some governments (e.g. Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Austria, and France) with the goal of cost-containment (Marinoso, Jelovac, and Olivella 
2008). Under cross-country reference pricing systems, governments mandate companies to submit 
their product’s prices in a pre-defined set of reference countries. From the prices in this pre-defined set 
of reference countries, a reference price (often the average price across all reference countries) is 
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derived. This reference price can be set as the minimum or average of the prices in the reference 
countries. In both cases, the reference price becomes a ceiling price and a drug’s price can thus 
typically not exceed this ‘reference price’ (Gregson et al. 2005). Based on conversations with 
practitioners, pharmaceutical companies update a molecule’s price in a focal country by looking at 
prices of that molecule in other countries up until 4 months before the considered timing in the focal 
country. Most reference pricing systems are asymmetric, in the sense that countries that are included in 
a specific country’s reference set, do not necessarily include that specific country in their own 
reference set. For instance, the Dutch health administrators consider prices in a reference set that 
consists of the U.K., Belgium, France and Germany, while the Netherlands itself is included as a 
reference country in the reference pricing systems of Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Ireland, 
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Greece. Given that we also include the 
geographic closeness in our framework, we control for the fact that the set of reference countries can 
be based on geography. 
The existence of a cross-country reference pricing system may lead to the spill-over of prices from the 
reference countries to the focal country. For instance, in the case of the Netherlands, health 
administrators will set a lower reference price the lower the drug´s prices are in the U.K., Belgium, 
France and Germany. This lower reference price leads to a lower ceiling which the price of the 
manufacturer for the Netherlands cannot cross. Given that the manufacturer will attempt to approach 
the ceiling as closely as possible in the negotiation, a lower ceiling will ultimately lead to a lower 
negotiated price.  
As stated above, it is commonly observed that the regulator often turns its focus to costs rather than 
benefits as drugs mature. As the cost focus increases, the reference prices will dominate negotiations 
between firm and regulator. This increased focus on reference prices, may enhance the extent to which 
prices will spill over from reference countries to the focal country.  
Chapter IV 97
IV.3.2 Other Variables that Affect Pharmaceutical Prices 
As we estimate pricing spill-over across countries, we also need to control for the influence of 
other drug and country characteristics that may affect drug prices. At the country level, the presence or 
absence of certain regulatory systems in addition to the economic wealth of the country could play a 
role (Danzon et al. 2005). Regulation has been looked at in different formats but it has not been 
connected to prices. Based on previous research on launch prices, economic wealth, the degree to 
which a new drug is the first in its therapeutic class and whether or not the country in which the firm is 
launching the drug is the home country of the manufacturer can influence the price (Chintagunta and 
Desiraju 2005; Ekelund and Persson 2003; Lu and Comanor 1998; Verniers et al. 2009). According to 
Verniers et al. (2009), the launch timing in comparison to the first launch worldwide can also influence 
launch prices. We incorporate these variables in the model section and discuss them in the data 
section. In addition to the cross-country spill-overs, we also explore whether these variables have a 
different influence on prices across the product life cycle. 
IV.4 Model 
Let  be the mean-centered deflated price of drug k (k = 1,…, K) in country i (i = 1,…, n)  at 
time t. The time elapsed since the introduction of a molecule k in a given country i is denoted 
 with  the introduction time of molecule k in country i. For the sake of conciseness, 
we denote  by t’. 
Drug prices are modeled as a function of (i) molecule fixed effects; (2) cross-country price interactions 
and (3) other molecule and country characteristics: 
,  (1) 
with 
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with
ka  a molecule fixed effect and I being an indicator variable. The cross-country price interaction 
term models the dependence between the focal country’s price at time t and the lagged prices in all 
other countries where the molecule is already sold.
15
 In this specification, the coefficients 'ijth  capture 
the time-varying cross-country price interaction at lag l, which may be determined by geographic, 
economic and regulatory ties as follows: 
   (2) 
The interaction between country i and country j depends on their geographic (
geo
ijw ), economic (
eco
ijtw ),
and regulatory ties (
reg
ijtw ). We discuss the operationalization of these ties in the data section. 
We can now re-write the cross-country price interaction term as follows: 
           
              (3) 
                                                
15
 The lags we consider make assumptions about the backward looking behavior of pharmaceutical companies and public 
policy. A lag of 1 means that these parties take into consideration the prices in previously launched countries until one 
month before launch in a focal country. We specify various lags l, l =1 to 6 to check the robustness of our findings. All lag 
values are highly correlated with each other (r > 95%) suggesting a large price inertia over the PLC. Therefore, the results 
remain unchanged for all lags between l=1 and l=6. 
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The time-varying parameters 
int
'tb ,
geo
t 'b ,
eco
t 'b and 
reg
t 'b capture the effect of the economic, geographic 
and regulatory ties on the cross-country price interactions. In order to be able to compare the intensity 
of the effect of each type of tie, we scale each variable by dividing them by their standard deviation 
across all molecule-country-time data points. 
We allow the effect of each tie to vary across the drug life cycle as follow: 
'int
1
int
0
int
' tt bbb +=          (4) 
'
10' t
geogeogeo
t bbb +=          (5) 
'
10' t
ecoecoeco
t bbb +=          (6) 
'
10' t
regregreg
t bbb +=          (7) 
Other variables we control for are included in the vector. We consider the following drug and 
country drivers: the variables 
itNTROLREGPRICECO , itREGPROFIT , itREGCROSS , itREGREF ,
and 
itOREGPHARMAC represent the regulatory environment of a country, as further detailed in the 
data section. We also include the economic wealth of country i at time t (operationalized as the real 
GDP per capita) 
itWEALTH , an indicator variable capturing whether molecule k is the first molecule
available of its therapeutic category in country i,
ikCOMP , and an indicator variable capturing whether 
the focal country i hosts the headquarter of the firm selling the focal molecule k,
ikHOME . We also 
include the introductory lag (or launch window in months) of molecule k in country i.
'
ikLW  represents 
the launch window of drug k in country i, obtained through an instrumental variables procedure 
(described below). We instrument launch window, as it is a decision variable for the firm that may be 
influenced by the prices a firm expects to obtain. We can thus write: 
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tg
            (8) 
We also allow the effect of these control variables to vary over time t, in the same fashion as for the 
other time varying coefficients (cfr. Equation (4), (5), (6), and (7). As mentioned before, we deal with 
the potential endogeneity of the introductory lag variable using 2-stage least squares. Similar to 
Stremersch and Lemmens (2009), we take the variables (see above) in addition to the four 
Hofstede cultural dimensions, population size, patent index
16
,  and  the introductory lag of all other 
drugs but drug k in country i . We then construct the instrument as the predicted value from a 
regression of the endogenous variable  on  standing for the exogenous variables in  (but 
) and .
IV.5 Data 
In this section, we give an overview of the research context and the variables mentioned in the 
model section, after which we describe pricing patterns across countries at several points in the 
product life cycle.
IV.5.1 Research Context 
We obtained data on prices of 16 new molecules (active substances of a drug) in 4 anatomical 
therapeutic classes (ATC; WHO Collaboratory Center for Drug Statistics Methodology) and 39 
countries (both developed and developing countries) worldwide from IMS Health (see Table 1). 
                                                
16
 See Verniers et al. (2009) 
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These molecules’ retail sales represent more than 90% of their total sales volume, meaning they are 
consistently used in the outpatient environment.  Column 1 in Table 1 represents the categories ATC1 
and ATC3
17
 to which our molecules belong. Column 2 gives the more specific fourth level ATC code 
and the last column gives the number of molecules in our dataset that belong to these categories. 
ATC1 and ATC3 Codes ATC4 Code Nr of Molecules
ATC1: C Cardiovascular system
C10A: lipid modifying agents, plain C10AA 4
ATC1: G Genito-urinary system and sex hormones
G4B: other urologicals, incl. Antispasmodics G4BD 2
G4BE 5
ATC1: R Respiratory system
R6A: antihistamines for systemic use R6AX 5
Table 1: Overview of the categories in our sample
IV.5.2 Variable Operationalization 
The drug price we gathered is the ex manufacturer price per gram of active substance in US 
dollars.  We operationalize the dependent variable price as follows. We deflate these drug prices by 
dividing them by the time-varying country-specific consumer price index (CPI, base year 2000): 
 Given high variation in mean drug prices across molecules, we divide the deflated price 
by the average price of a given molecule across countries such that all molecules have a cross-country 
average price equal to one. We refer to this variable as the mean-centered deflated price of drug k in 
country i at time t.
                                                
17
 The number in ATC1 and ATC3 refers to the categorization level. The third level ATC code (ATC3) gives a more 
specific drug categorization than the first level ATC code (ATC1). 
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Some of our price series show missing values in specific time periods (3,6% of all molecule-country-
time combinations). We handle such missing values with the multiple imputation algorithm developed 
by Honaker, King, and Blackwell (2009). The algorithm specifies a country- and product-specific 
cubic time trend and accounts for lagged effects of price.  
As stated above, we explain spill-over in prices across international markets through three types of ties 
– geographic, economic and regulatory – between countries. We next detail the operationalization of 
these ties, each in turn.  
The geographic tie between country i and j,  is operationalized as the inverse of the distance 
between the capitals of country i and country j (in kms). We gathered this data from the Research 
Center in International Economics (CEPII).  
The economic tie between country i and j at time t denoted  is operationalized as the size of 
country i’s imports from country j (in US dollars) at time t, divided by the nominal GDP in country i
(in US dollars) at time t. We extracted this data from the United Nations Statistical Division.  
The regulatory tie between country i and j denoted  captures the existence of a reference pricing 
system in country i that includes country j as a reference market at time t. This variable takes the value 
of 0 in case such tie is absent. In case country i refers to country j, this variable takes the value of 1, 
divided by the total number of countries in country i´s reference set.   We gathered this data from 
reports by Urch Publishing, pharmaceutical firms and health regulators. While the geographic ties are 
time-invariant, the economic and regulatory ties are time-varying.  
As the regulatory environment is intrinsically complex, with subtle differences across countries, 
empirical testing demands a clear-cut operationalization of the regulatory environment (e.g. Kyle 
2007b; Stremersch & Lemmens 2009; Verniers et al. 2009; Vernon, Golec, & Keener Hughen 2006).  
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We control for the five regulatory variables that were also included in Verniers et al. (2009) 
· Ex-manufacturer price regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a direct restriction of 
price levels by the regulator (Heuer, Mejer, and Neuhaus 2007; Kyle 2007b), denoted 
REGPRICECONTROLi;
· Profit control regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a threshold on the profits 
pharmaceutical companies can obtain, denoted REGPROFITi; 
· Cross-country reference pricing regulation: the presence (=1) or absence (=0) of a requirement 
to submit information by the manufacturer on drug prices in other countries (Dukes, Haaijer-
Ruskamp, de Jonckheere and Rietveld 2003), denoted REGCROSSi.
· Therapeutic reference pricing regulation: whether health regulators generate a reference price 
for a cluster of drugs that have therapeutic similarities (=1) or not (=0), above which price the 
patient is surcharged (Danzon and Ketcham 2003), denoted REGREFi; 
· Pharmaco-economic evidence regulation: whether health regulators ask for some proof of the 
drug’s cost effectiveness over time (=1) or not (=0) (Dickson, Hurst, and Jacobzone 2003; 
Dukes et al. 2003; Garber and Phelps 1997), denoted REGPHARMACOi;
We gathered information on these regulatory variables from reports by pharmaceutical companies (e.g. 
Novartis 2004), OECD (Jacobzone 2000) and Urch publishing (Urch 2001a, 2001b, 2002, and 2005), 
as well as personal conversation with countries’ health ministries. Finally, we also control for a 
country’s economic wealth, competition, the drug manufacturer’s home country, the molecule´s launch 
window, and molecule dummies.  
Economic wealth (WEALTHi) is measured by the natural logarithm of the real GDP per capita in 
country i. This data was extracted from the Worldbank.  
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To control for the effect of competition on prices, we constructed an indicator variable that gets value 
1 if the molecule is the first molecule in its ATC3 category (COMPik) for molecule k in country i, 
based on the IMS Health data. The home country of the company launching a specific molecule k  in 
country i (HOMEik) is operationalized as a dummy variable with value 1 if the company’s headquarter 
is located in the country of launch i, and 0 if this is not the case (Danzon et al. 2005; Kyle 2007b). The 
launch window or launch lag (
ikLW ) of molecule k in country i is operationalized as the difference (in 
months) between the month in which the drug was launched in the first country worldwide and the 
month in which the drug was launched in country i (Danzon et al. 2005). The month of launch is the 
first month in which sales of the new drug are non-zero. If a drug k is launched for the first time 
worldwide in January 2001 in country X and it is launched subsequently in country Y in June 2001, 
the launch window of drug k in country X is equal to zero months and the launch window of drug k in 
country Y is equal to five months.  
IV.5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
We present price deviations (leads and lags) at launch, at 24 months, and at 48 months in Table 
2. The second, fourth, and sixth column in Table 2 show the countries’ deviation from the mean price 
at time t across molecules. Price deviations were calculated as follows. First, we computed the mean 
price for each molecule across the countries. Then, within each molecule, we computed the percentage 
deviation of the country-specific price from the mean price over all countries. Finally, we averaged 
these percentage deviations for each specific country over all molecules launched in that country. A
negative deviation means that a drug is typically priced at a relatively low level in a country whereas a 
positive deviation indicates that a drug is typically priced at a relatively high level in a country. 
Similar to Verniers et al. (2009), who study these price deviations at launch, we find that North 
America, Asia, and South America show positive deviations from the worldwide average launch price, 
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while the other world regions show a negative deviation from the average launch price worldwide. 
This observation is similar after 24 and 48 months. Over time, North America consistently has the 
relatively highest price levels whereas Africa and the Middle East have the relatively lowest price 
levels.  
Over time, Japan and the U.S. have the largest positive deviation from the average price worldwide. 
Prices do differ over time but there are differences across countries. For example, Sweden starts off at 
a relatively low price level but quickly increases this level. This is in line with the finding by Ekelund 
and Persson (2003) that prices in that country follow a penetration pattern. The Netherlands starts off 
at a relatively high price level but quickly lowers its prices (i.e. skimming). 
t=1 Position t=24 Position t=48 Position
North America 0,42 1 1,11 1 0,86 1
U.S. 0,79 2,84 1,47
Mexico 0,29 0,55 0,91
Canada 0,17 -0,06 0,21
Western Europe -0,10 6 -0,13 7 -0,06 6
Netherlands 0,10 -0,09 -0,08
Switzerland -0,03 -0,12 -0,13
U.K. -0,03 0,03 0,06
Ireland -0,08 -0,06 0,03
Italy -0,08 -0,16 -0,08
Norway -0,08 -0,15 -0,03
Luxemburg -0,10 -0,19 -0,24
Portugal -0,10 -0,22 -0,05
France -0,11 -0,17 -0,01
Sweden -0,13 0,13 0,25
Germany -0,13 -0,11 0,04
Spain -0,13 -0,16 0,03
Belgium -0,13 -0,21 -0,25
Greece -0,16 -0,24 -0,09
Austria -0,17 -0,22 -0,29
Finland -0,17 -0,20 0,02
Denmark -0,18 -0,11 -0,19
South America 0,14 3 0,00 3 0,04 4
Colombia 0,42 0,30 0,39
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Ecuador 0,13 0,03 -0,06
Argentina 0,11 -0,06 -0,07
Brazil 0,10 -0,03 0,21
Chile -0,04 -0,23 -0,23
Oceania -0,07 5 -0,08 4 0,77 2
New Zealand -0,05 -0,07 0,13
Australia -0,08 -0,10 1,42
Asia 0,41 2 0,39 2 0,48 3
Japan 0,89 0,90 0,97
Philippines -0,06 -0,10 0,00
Eastern Europe -0,05 4 -0,09 5 -0,02 5
Poland 0,01 -0,15 0,35
Hungary -0,00 -0,04 -0,07
Estonia -0,02 -0,08 -0,03
Latvia -0,05 -0,01 -0,00
Lithuania -0,05 -0,00 0,02
Czech Republic -0,07 -0,15 -0,23
Slovakia -0,15 -0,17 -0,18
Africa and the Middle 
East
-0,15 7 -0,13 6 -0,18 7
United Arabic Emirates -0,09 -0,06 -0,08
Morocco -0,14 -0,18 -0,17
Saudi Arabia -0,23 -0,15 -0,28
Table 2: Price deviations at several points in time
IV.6 Results 
In Table 3, we present the explanatory variables in the first column. The second column contains 
the coefficients belonging to those variables and the significance level of each coefficient obtained 
from estimating equation (1). The third column then contains the standard error. Our full model has an 
adjusted R-squared of 0.78 which is very satisfactory. 
IV.6.1 Cross-Country Spill-Overs 
The results show that there is a base spill-over in price (
int
0b = 3.18e-01, p<0.001). This base 
spill-over in price decreases across the product life cycle ( int
1b = -5.08e-03, p<0.001).  
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Being geographically closer to other countries (
geo
0b = 1.42e-02, p<0.001) and having a stronger trade 
relationship with other countries (
eco
0b =0.011, p<0.001) causes prices to be more similar across these 
countries. The effect of geographic closeness increases over the product life cycle ( geo
1b = 1.77e-03, 
p<0.001) while the effect of trade relationships does not significantly increase over time ( eco
1b is non-
significant). The latter finding may be due to the fact that international traders learn faster in 
comparison to customers across countries. The regulatory tie effect is negative at launch, while it turns 
positive after 24 months and even more positive after 48 months (
reg
0b = -7.32e-02, p<0.001 and
reg
1b =
2.97e-03, p<0.001). This fits our expectation that over time, regulators would become more price-
oriented and use low prices in reference countries to lower prices in their own country. However, the 
finding that reference price systems trigger negative price spill-over at launch is contrary to our 
expectations. A possible explanation for this finding is that firms first launch in high-price countries 
within the reference set, only after which they enter in low-price countries (a waterfall from high price 
to low price countries within the reference set). Such non-random launch sequence within the 
reference set, uncaptured by our model, may generate the negative spill-over we find.  
IV.6.2 Control  Variables 
The regulatory environment of a country significantly influences prices. Countries that impose 
an ex-manufacturer price control show lower drug prices than countries that do not impose such a 
price control (
NTROLREGPRICECO
0g =-0.15, p<0.001). This is in line with the ultimate goal of such a 
regulation i.e. to put a ceiling on drugs’ prices. Ex manufacturer price control caps the ex manufacturer 
price (the price charged by the manufacturer to the wholesaler) of a pharmaceutical product. Prices in 
markets with ex manufacturer price controls are thus bounded by the reservation price of the public 
health administrator and therefore show lower introductory prices than markets without such control 
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(Mossialos et al. 2004). The negative effect of this type of regulation on the price level disappears over 
time ( NTROLREGPRICECO
1g =2.73e-03, p<0.001). In countries with profit control, drug companies are free to 
set their own prices but cannot exceed a predetermined profit ceiling (Jacobzone 2000). Profits in 
excess of the agreed upon return-on-capital threshold provide incentives for manufacturers to set their 
prices so that profits do not exceed the return-on-capital threshold. The regulation that puts a cap on 
the profits that pharmaceutical companies can obtain over a certain period actually increases price 
levels  (
REGPROFIT
0g =6.26e-02, p<0.01). Over time, this positive effect on prices disappears (
REGPROFIT
1g
=-1.48e-03, p<0.001). Possibly, pharmaceutical companies try to circumvent this regulation by setting 
high prices in the beginning of the product life cycle so that they have guarantueed profits. This 
regulation is also less strict than the ex-manufacturer price control which can explain why profit 
control does not lead to lower prices. The effect of the cross-country reference pricing system on 
prices is negative which means that countries that consider prices in other countries have lower prices 
than countries that take into consideration the prices of the same drug in other countries (
REGCROSS
0g =-
9.88e-02, p<0.001).  We see that this negative effect disappears over time ( REGCROSS
1g =2.43e-03, 
p<0.001). Internal reference pricing refers to the presence (or absence) of a system to classify products 
into clusters based on therapeutic similarity (Danzon and Furukawa 2003). Health regulators set a 
reference price for each cluster based on a low priced product. If the manufacturer price is set above 
this reference level, the patient is surcharged. Internal reference pricing is different from ex 
manufacturer price control in that it concerns the reimbursement level of a drug, rather than its price 
(Dukes et al. 1998). Therefore, this regulation is less stringent on the price level. Companies seem to 
be taking the risk of imposing a higher price. Countries with an internal reference pricing system have 
higher prices than countries that do not need to look at prices of other drugs in the same category as a 
basis for reimbursement. Over time, prices become lower in countries with such a system (
REGREF
0g
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=5.14e-02, p<0.001 and
REGREF
1g =-1.77e-03, p<0.001). The latter can be a consequence of the fact 
that more mature drugs potentially face more competition of branded drugs. To stay competitive, 
companies then do not want to surcharge patients too much. Regulators may also require 
pharmaceutical firms to provide pharmaco-economic evidence on their new drug (Dickson et al. 
2003). That way, regulators try to establish fair prices on the basis of calculations where the costs of a 
drug are compared with its direct and indirect benefits. Pharmaco-economic evidence inventories the 
cost-effectiveness of a treatment with a new drug as the ratio of the cost of treatment (including the 
drug price, but also for instance, hospital stays, surgery, etc.) to relevant measures of its effect (Garber 
and Phelps 1997). This requirement demands – on top of the clinical evidence provided to gain 
therapeutic approval by institutes such as FDA or EMEA – evidence on the cost-effectiveness in the 
local population that needs to be submitted in complicated administrative procedures. It makes the 
market access procedure more evidence-based (Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009), which effectively 
yields higher prices, because of stronger clinical evidence. Over time, pharmaceutical companies can 
even deliver stronger clinical evidence which in our empirical test seems to increase the price levels 
even more (
OREGPHARMAC
0g =0.23, p<0.05 and 
OREGPHARMAC
1g =1.96e-03, p<0.001). 
Wealthier countries have higher drug prices but over time, this positive effect on prices 
decreases (
WEALTH
0g =2.59e-06, p<0.001 and 
WEALTH
1g =-2.15e-08, p<0.001). Being the first drug in a 
category significantly increases the prices of new drugs but over time prices gradually decrease            
(
COMP
0g =0.23, p<0.001 and
COMP
1g = -3.84e-03, p<0.001). The countries that are the home country of 
the manufacturer of a new drug also have higher prices and these prices increase over time (
HOME
0g
=0.49, p<0.001 and HOME
1g =1.56e-03, p<0.05). Lastly, although launch window shows an inverted U 
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effect on price in the beginning of the product life cycle, this is not significant. Over time, we see that 
this effect becomes U-shaped (
LW
0g =2.53e-02, p<0.001, 
2
0
LWg =-1.11e-04, LW
1g =-1.00e-03, p<0.001 
and        2
1
LWg =6.14e-06, p<0.01). 
Variable Symbol Coefficient Std. Error
Base price interaction
int
0b 3.18e-01*** 5.28e-02
Geographic tie
geo
0b 1.42e-02*** 1.53e-02
Economic tie
eco
0b 1.10e-01*** 1.51e-02
Regulatory tie
reg
0b -7.32e-02*** 1.30e-02
Ex manufacturer price control
NTROLREGPRICECO
0g -1.51e-01*** 1.72e-02
Profit control 
REGPROFIT
0g 6.26e-02** 2.09e-02
Cross-country reference pricing 
REGCROSS
0g -9.88e-02*** 1.91e-02
Therapeutic reference pricing
REGREF
0g 5.14e-02*** 1.40e-02
Pharmaco-economic evidence
OREGPHARMAC
2.81e-02* 1.28e-02
Economic wealth
WEALTH
0g 2.59e-06*** 4.44e-07
Competition
COMP
0g 2.28e-01*** 4.32e-02
Firm's home country
HOME
0g 4.91e-01*** 3.94e-02
Launch window
LW
0g 2.53e-02*** 4.73e-03
Launch window
2 2
0
LWg -1.11e-04 9.21e-05
Base price interaction*time
int
1b -5.08e-03*** 1.91e-04
Geographic tie*time
geo
1b 1.77e-03*** 2.12e-04
Economic tie*time
eco
1b -6.70e-05 1.75e-04
Regulatory tie*time
reg
1b 2.97e-03*** 1.80e-04
Ex manufacturer price control*time
NTROLREGPRICECO
1g 2.73e-03*** 2.47e-04
Profit control *time
REGPROFIT
1g -1.48e-03*** 2.93e-04
Cross-country reference pricing *time
REGCROSS
1g 2.43e-03*** 2.81e-04
Therapeutic reference pricing*time
REGREF
1g -1.77e-03*** 2.21e-04
Pharmaco-economic evidence*time
OREGPHARMAC
1.96e-03*** 2.06e-04
Economic wealth*time
WEALTH
1g -2.15e-08*** 6.09e-09
Competition*time
COMP
1g -3.84e-03*** 5.54e-04
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Table 3: Overview of the results 
We also checked the robustness of our results.  A model without the cross-country spill-over shows 
consistent results but reduces the adjusted R-squared of our model by 6%. A model without the 
interactions with time has an adjusted R-squared of 0.61. We also estimate three different models in 
which each model contains the base spill-over. In the first model, we only added geographic tie. In the 
second model, we only added the economic tie while in the third model we added the regulatory tie. 
We randomly left out molecules and limited time to 6 years after introduction. All results remain the 
same. 
IV.7 Discussion 
We have shown that price spill-overs between countries exist and that this price spill-over is 
influenced by geographic closeness, trade relations, and cross-country reference pricing. Based on 
these ties between countries, we can determine which countries exert which influence on which 
countries with regard to prices of new drugs. For each country in our dataset we can explain on which 
country it exerts the largest influence at several points in time. For example, at four years after launch 
of a drug, Belgium exerts the largest influence on Luxemburg whereas the Netherlands exert the 
largest influence on Belgium with regard to drug prices. The US exerts the largest influence on 
Canada. 
Firm's home country*time
HOME
1g 1.56e-03* 6.35e-04
Launch window*time
LW
1g -1.00e-03*** 8.83e-05
Launch window
2
*time
2
1
LWg 6.14e-06** 2.14e-06
Molecule effects
ka ***
Time
tg 6.77e-03*** 6.66e-04
Constant
0a -3.92*** 0.16
Adjusted R-squared 0.78
N 41558
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Our model allows firms to calculate the global effect of a price decision in one country, e.g. a 10% 
price decrease in the Netherlands. Such information is useful for the firm in multiple ways. First, it 
allows the firm to calculate the global effect of entry in a country at a certain price. For instance, entry 
in low-price countries is often a cause for debate within firms. The international price decreases a low-
price entry may invoke, may outweigh the revenues gained from the low-price country in question. 
Our results allow a firm to not only build expectations on the prices (and thus, revenues) it will obtain 
in the focal country, but also on price changes (e.g. revenue decreases) it may trigger in other 
countries. Second, national governments or insurers periodically renegotiate prices with 
pharmaceutical firms. In such negotiations, pharmaceutical firms should not only be able to calculate 
the effect of price changes on volume (to calculate revenues after the price change), but also the spill-
over of a lower price to other countries, as it may threaten revenue streams in other countries as well. 
Our study has several limitations that can be addressed in future research.  
First, although we already have an extensive set of countries, we could get more insights from 
incorporating all countries worldwide as this would make the ties between countries more complete. 
However, obtaining price data on more countries will prove to be difficult given that we are working 
with the largest pharmaceutical data supplier IMS Health. 
Second, we do not have detailed information on the copayment levels in each country. Thus, 
we can make inferences only on the ex-manufacturer price and not on the price charged to the end-
consumer.  
Third, the external referencing pricing systems entails that the price in a focal country is 
influenced by the minimum or average value of the prices in other countries. However, we do not have 
any more precise information on the calculus conducted by all countries, nor on whether they use the 
average or the minimum price, nor on how far in history regulators go back for reference prices in 
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other countries. Such more detailed information could lead to a more detailed model of cross-country 
price effects.  
Fourth, other time trends than the linear time trend need to be tested for to gain more insight 
into the variation of the effect of ties on drug prices. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions and Future Research 
In this chapter, I provide a summary for each of the papers in this thesis. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the key findings of each of these chapters. As I stated in the introduction, the fields 
studied in this dissertation have been understudied for a long time. Thus, even at the point of 
completion of my thesis, I can think of many additional questions that remain unanswered and that are 
in need of scientific inquiry. Within the two types of scientific innovation that I introduced in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis, I identify and discuss directions for future research in Figure 1. 
Chapter Title Key Findings
2 The Quest for Citations: Drivers 
of Article Impact
What is said in a marketing article 
and who says it is more important 
than how it is said in terms of 
obtaining citations.
3 Launch Lag and Price of New 
Pharmaceuticals: A Global 
Inquiry
Launch lag has an inverted U 
effect on launch price and launch 
price has a U shaped effect on 
launch lag.
4 International Spill-Overs in
Pharmaceutical Pricing: The 
Role of Geography, Trade, and 
Regulation
Positive price spill-over exists.
Countries that are geographically 
close and that have stronger trade 
relationships with each other show 
higher spill-overs. A regulatory 
connection only spills over in 
more mature life cycle stages of a 
drug.
Table 1: Overview of the Dissertation Research 
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Figure 1: Future Research Directions in Marketing of Scientific Innovations
Chapter 2 focused on marketing of innovations in research (where know-why dominates) i.e. 
new manuscripts published in academic journals. Within research, chapter 2 focused on the marketing 
domain i.e. marketing manuscripts published in marketing journals such as Journal of Consumer 
Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Marketing Science, and the 
International Journal of Resarch in Marketing.
This paper examined why some articles in marketing are more heavily cited than others. I 
showed that marketing articles’ citations are primarily influenced by the universalist and social 
constructivist perspective. The universalist perspective entailed the quality of the article and the 
domain of the article whereas the social constructivist perspective looked at the visibility of the 
authors and personal promotion by these authors. The presentation perspective (e.g. number of figures, 
tables, readability) had less influence on the number of citations an article receives.  
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This chapter contributes to the larger field of scientometrics by providing an integrated 
conceptual framework for analyzing the number of citations an article receives at a certain point in 
time. In the marketing domain, it contributes to marketing scholars’ understanding of impact on the 
article level. Although chapter 2 focused on the marketing domain, the conceptual framework can be 
applied to many other domains. A comparison across domains based on this framework can help to 
map out citation practices and differences across domains. Each domain has its particularities which 
can be operationalized accordingly. For example, the subject areas mentioned in chapter 2 are 
marketing specific. However, if characteristics of these subject areas can be identified such as the age 
of the domain, the existing citation practices, the number of scientists working in that domain, …, 
prediction can be facilitated towards other subject areas in other domains or new subject areas. 
In the study of marketing of academic innovations, the following future research topics come to mind.  
First, Chapter 2 studied the number of citations a marketing article had received at the end of 2004. I 
controlled for the time the article had been out but did not examine the product life cycle of citations. 
In promotion decisions, the number of citations a publication has at a certain point in time is evaluated. 
For forecasting reasons, it would be valuable to know whether citations of a publication reach a 
takeoff or whether a slowdown moment can be discerned (Golder and Tellis 1997 and 2004; Tellis, 
Stremersch, and Yin 2003). This would provide evaluators with a forecasting tool given the current 
number of citations an article has and thus would lead to a more informed decision on the impact 
publications of an academic scholar have. In a similar vein, diffusion patterns of subject areas could 
also be a valuable tool to predict the evolution of subject areas with similar characteristics. 
In addition to the examination of the citation patterns, it could also be interesting to examine 
the origin of citations. In almost all scientometric articles, citations are considered to be a proxy for the 
impact a publication has. Impact then brings to mind a positive connotation. However, not all articles 
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are cited because of admiration of the idea presented in the cited paper. Articles are also frequently 
cited for reasons of disconfirmation or for their limitations. Both articles contribute to the evolution of 
science but both citations forms can have different drivers. Considering citations across these two (or 
even more) categories and examining their determinants could add insights to the field of 
scientometrics in marketing. 
Second, Chapter 2 showed that the social constructivist perspective is important in order to 
receive citations. An academic scholar’s visibility thus is of huge importance. One way to increase that 
visibility is by collaborating with well-known academic scholars in the field. These well-known 
scholars have more experience in publishing. Therefore, they can be of great value to young scholars 
in terms of focusing on the ideal attributes and the positioning of a paper. A strategic choice of co-
authors on a paper can therefore increase a scholar’s impact. A research avenue worth examining is 
how academic scholars go about selecting their collaboration partners. Goldenberg et al. (2010) 
recently examined collaboration networks but did not focus on the selection process. Such data on 
collaborations could be helpful in examining the collaborator selection process. In a similar vein, I 
could examine how collaboration networks change across a scholar’s product life cycle (when 
evolving from junior scholar to senior scholar) and whether impact is connected to such changes.  
Third, we should all be encouraged to write ‘interesting’ papers. We can assume that such 
papers fascinate readers and therefore are disseminated more. This would then consequently translate 
into more citations. But what constitutes interestingness of a paper? Future research could explore 
whether a scale can be developed that measures ‘interestingness’ of papers. These measures could then 
be related to the number of citations an article receives. 
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Chapter 3 and 4 both focused on marketing of innovations in a domain where know-why is 
important and often translates into an application i.e. innovations in the life sciences. Life sciences 
entail know-why as it examines why a certain therapy affects the human body in a certain way. When 
this process is successful, a new molecule is launched into the market at a certain price. 
Chapter 3 focused on the worldwide commercialization of new drugs in the pharmaceutical 
industry. The paper examined whether the moment at which a drug is launched in a specific country is 
interrelated with the price at which a drug is launched. I hypothesized that this interrelationship is 
driven by both pharmaceutical companies’ and health regulators’ objectives at several points in time. 
An early launch, even if at a lower price, allows companies a longer time under patent protection to 
recoup their R&D investments. A relatively high price may outweigh the benefits of prompt market 
access for regulators. The paper showed that launch timing has an inverted U effect on launch price 
while introduction price has a U shaped effect on launch timing. 
 This paper contributes to academia by focusing on the lead-lag effect that examines whether 
adoption of new products occurs faster in countries in which the product is launched later. Whereas the 
original lead-lag effect focuses on sales, we connect the lag in launch timing to the launch price levels 
of new drugs. Thus, the original lead-lag effect examines the demand side (adoption) of a new product, 
whereas we look at the supply side of an innovation across countries worldwide. We do this in a 
context in which two parties with different objectives have an influence on both of these decisions 
(launch lag and launch price). Over time, we observe outcomes when both parties converge in the 
negotiation process, despite their different objectives. 
Chapter 4 examined whether cross-country spill-overs in price exist and which type of ties 
between countries influence these spill-overs: geography, trade relations, or regulation. We found that 
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prices in (previously launched) countries do spill over to prices in other countries. Geographically 
close countries and countries that share strong trade relationships show similar price levels. The cross-
country reference pricing system that exists amongst countries also influences spill-over in prices.  
This paper contributes to the academic marketing literature by focusing on ties between 
countries and the outcome of these ties in terms of similarities or dissimilarities between prices. 
Whereas previous studies have focused on the influence of ties on entry through subsidiaries or 
adoption of new product, pricing has remained unexplored. Although a correlation can be expected 
between strength of ties between countries and multinational pricesetting behavior, no formal test has 
been developed in academic literature. Furthermore, we also provide insights into the influence of 
these ties on the pricing patterns of new products across the product life cycle. 
In the study of marketing of life science innovations, I think of the following future research 
topics. 
First, given that on the one hand order of entry has an interrelationship with the launch price 
(Chapter 3) and on the other hand, pharmaceutical companies seem to choose countries strategically in 
order to get a high price (Chapter 4), an optimal sequence model would combine these insights. Such a 
model would provide practitioners with a valuable tool to make informed decisions such that profits 
are maximized (work in progress). The model would explain which countries should be entered at 
what time to maximize profits to pharmaceutical companies.  
Second, in the pharmaceutical drug market, generics receive an increasing amount of attention. 
Generic drugs are medicine with the same chemical composition as branded drugs but they are sold at 
much lower prices after the patent of a branded medicine expires. Generics thus have the potential to 
cause huge cost-savings in a lot of countries worldwide. However, countries show huge differences in 
the way they adopt generics. A first contribution therefore lies in finding the drivers of countries’ 
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adoption behavior towards generics. As generics’ main difference in comparison to branded drugs is 
the price level, another research avenue would be to explore whether generic brands influence branded 
pharmaceuticals’ prices. This effect could be different dependent on the country studied and this 
country’s attitude towards generic medicine.
Third, academic scholars have shown that pioneers frequently do not stay the market leader. In 
the pharmaceutical industry, it would be interesting to contrast the influence of order of entry on 
market shares of branded drugs to the influence of order of entry on market shares of generic drugs 
(Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009). It is plausible that generics would be able to maintain a pioneering 
advantage because it is mainly the pioneering generic brand that takes advantage from the large price 
differential between the branded and the generic version. Conceptually, this would mean that we 
examine how the relationship between order of entry and market share is influenced by the product 
type. Therefore, such a research project would add to the literature on order of entry. In an 
international context, such a paper could also examine whether international differences in such a 
relationship exist and what the drivers of these differences are. 
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Essays on Marketing of Scientific Innovations 
Short Dutch Summary (Korte Nederlandse Samenvatting) 
Dit proefschrift omvat 3 studies met een focus op het vermarkten van wetenschappelijke 
innovaties. Studie 1 focust op academische innovaties (wetenschappelijke artikels) terwijl de studies 2 
en 3 focussen op innovaties in de life sciences (e.g. de farmaceutische industrie). Op het vlak van 
marketing bestudeert studie 1 verscheidene marketing concepten zoals product attributen, 
positionering, distributie, etc. Studie 2 en 3 bestuderen 2 specifiekere marketing gerelateerde 
elementen nl. lancering van nieuwe producten en prijszetting overheen de productlevenscyclus. 
In studie 1 bestudeer ik waarom sommige artikels meer impact hebben dan andere artikels in 
de marketing discipline. Ik beantwoord deze vraag door de invloed van artikel- en 
auteurskarakteristieken te bestuderen op het aantal citaten dat een artikel ontvangt. Daartoe bestudeer 
ik alle artikels in 5 vooraanstaande marketing journals tussen 1990 en 2002. Deze studie toont dat het 
aantal citaten dat een artikel in de marketing discipline ontvangt, afhangt van ‘wat men zegt’ in het 
artikel (kwaliteit en domein van het artikel) en ‘wie het zegt’ (visibiliteit van de auteurs en 
persoonlijke promotie). Impact hangt in veel mindere mate af van ‘hoe het gezegd wordt’ (vb. lengte 
van de titel, gebruik van figuren, leesbaarheid). Deze inzichten zijn relevant voor het management van 
wetenschappelijke tijdschriften en academici die beiden proberen hun citaten te maximaliseren. 
  
Studie 2 bestudeert de trade-off die farmaceutische bedrijven en regulatieve instanties maken 
ten aanzien van het lanceringstijdstip en de lanceringsprijs van nieuwe medicijnen. Farmaceutische 
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bedrijven wensen hun R&D investeringen te recupereren door een vroege lancering van hun 
medicijnen aan een hoge prijs aangezien deze beide elementen een invloed hebben op hun winsten. 
Regulatieve instanties willen gezondheidskosten laag houden (en dus lage prijzen) maar tegelijkertijd 
willen ze medicijnen snel beschikbaar maken die de levenskwaliteit verbeteren. Het lanceringstijdstip 
en de lanceringsprijs zijn het resultaat van onderhandelingen tussen beide partijen. Ik bestudeerde 58 
nieuwe medicijnen in 50 landen wereldwijd. Een bevinding is dat een lanceringsvertraging (t.o.v. de 
eerste lancering van het medicijn wereldwijd) van ongeveer 48 maanden geassocieerd wordt met een 
hogere prijs. Een andere bevinding is dat beide partijen de prijs niet gebruiken om het 
lanceringstijdstip te beïnvloeden maar de regulatieve instanties gebruiken wel het lanceringstijdstip 
strategisch om de lanceringsprijs te beïnvloeden. Onze bevindingen laten zowel farmaceutische 
bedrijven als regulatieve instanties toe het lanceringstijdstip en de lanceringsprijs te vergelijken over 
landen heen. 
Studie 3 focust op de prijspatronen over de productcyclus heen van nieuwe merkmedicijnen in 
39 landen wereldwijd. Bovendien onderzoek ik of de prijzen wederzijds afhankelijk zijn over deze 
landen heen. Vaak wordt aangenomen dat het bestaan van een regulatief systeem gelijkaardige 
prijsniveaus over landen heen veroorzaakt. Dit systeem bepaalt dat 1 bepaald land bij de prijszetting 
van een nieuw medicijn zich moet baseren op de prijs voor hetzelfde medicijn in andere landen. Deze 
studie toont aan dat prijzen wederzijds afhankelijk zijn. Dichter bij elkaar gelegen landen en landen die 
een sterkere handelsrelatie delen vertonen gelijkaardigere prijzen. Echter, de regulatieve band tussen 
landen vergroot de prijsafhankelijkheid tussen landen pas in latere fasen van de productlevenscyclus. 
Dit kan er mogelijks op wijzen dat farmaceutische bedrijven hun lanceringsvolgorde aanpassen om de 
invloed van deze regulering te vermijden. Dit onderzoek informeert zowel farmaceutische bedrijven 
als regulatieve instanties over prijspatronen van nieuwe medicijnen. 
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Dit proefschrift levert inzichten niet enkel op vlak van het algemeen vermarkten (product 
attributen, positioneren, distributiekanalen, etc.) van innovaties binnen een domein (nl. marketing in 
dit proefschrift) maar ook op het specifiek vermarkten (lanceringstijdstip en prijspatronen) van 
innovaties binnen de context van de farmaceutische industrie. 



